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THE HONOURABLE EUGENE A. FORSEY*
This article addresses the somewhat evasive topic of conventions. In the 
first part of the article, the author discusses conventions in a very general 
way as part of our “working Constitution of Canada". In so doing, he 
considers such questions as: What constitutes a convention?; How does 
it change?; and. In what circumstances does it change? Numerous ex­
amples of conventions are presented and examined. The second part of 
the article is more specifically concerned with the relationship between 
the courts and these conventions. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
patriation reference of 1982 to the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
author concludes by assessing the appropriate role of the courts with 
respect to matters of convention.
Cet étude adressera le sujet quelque peu évasif des conventions. En 
premier heu, l'auteur donnera au aperçu général des conventions en 
rapport avec le rôle de la Constitution du Canada dans notre vie quo­
tidienne. Entre autres, l'auteur discutera les questions suivants: Qiielle 
est une convention?; Comment peut-on modifier une convention?; Dans 
quelles circonstances est-ce qu 'une convention change? L'étude présentera 
et examinera plusieurs exemples de conventions. En deuxième lieu, l'au­
teur démontrera la relation qui existe entre les Cours et les conventions 
et, en particulier, il attirera l'attention sur la référence de patriation à 
la Cour Suprême du Canada en 1982. Finalement, l'étude évaluera le 
rôle des Cours le plus approprié en rapport aux affaires des conventions.
INTRODUCTION
T h e  w orking  C o nstitu tion  o f  C an ad a  has two basic parts: law, and  
conven tion . T ogether they m ake u p  th e  ru les by which we a re  governed .
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T h e  law of the  C onstitu tio n , in its tu rn , has two parts: w ritten  and  u n ­
w ritten . T h e  w ritten  C on stitu tio n , consists o f  fo u rteen  Acts o f  the  Parlia­
m ent o f  th e  U n ited  K ingdom , seven Acts o f  the  Parliam ent o f  C anada, and  
fo u r  O rd e rs  o f  th e  Im peria l Privy C ouncil.' T h e  u n w ritten  law is tha t p a rt 
o f  th e  English C om m on  Law d ea lin g  with constitu tional m a tte rs  which a re  
still applicable in C an ad a . T h e  m ost no tab le  exam ple  is, o f  course, the  royal 
p rerogative. T h e  law o f  th e  C o nstitu tion  is th e  skeleton o f  o u r  body politic.
C onven tion  is th e  acknow ledged , b ind ing , ex tra-legal custom s, usages, 
practices an d  u n d e rs ta n d in g s  by which o u r  system o f  governm en t o p e r ­
ates.- T h e  conven tions a re  th e  sinews an d  nerves of o u r  body politic.
T h e  law o f  th e  C o nstitu tion  is in te rp re te d  an d  en fo rced  by the  courts; 
breach  of th e  law carries legal p en a ltie s .' T h e  conventions a re  rarelv  even 
m en tio n ed  by th e  courts. B reach o f  th e  conventions carries no legal p e n ­
alties. T h e  sanctions a re  pure ly  political.
But th e  conven tions a re  im m easu iab b  im p o rtan t. T h e  law of out ( Con­
stitu tion  co n fe rs  en o rm o u s  pow er on the  Q u een  and  h er rep resen ta tives, 
the  G overn o r-G en era l an d  the  L ieu tenan t-G overno rs. A fo re ig n er, l ead ing  
onlv the  law, w ould conclude  th a t we live u n d e r  a despotism . In fact, these 
pow ers a re  exercised  bv M inisters responsible to the H ouse of C om m ons, 
which in tu rn  is responsib le  to  th e  people. But the law «»1 the C onstitu tion  
batelv  m en tions th e  most pow erfu l M inister, the  Prim e M inister; it sa \s  
n o th in g  abou t how he is a p p o in ted  o r rem oved; it confers on him  o n l\ two 
pow ers, both  ver\ m in o r .' T h e  o th e r  M inisters a re  not m en tioned  at all; 
n o r is th e  C ab inet; an d  of the  Cabinet s responsibilit\ to the  House- <»1 
C om m ons th e re  is not o n e  svliable. ’
In the  U nited  K ingdom , “unconstitu tional" m eans co n tra ry  to the co n ­
ventions. In C an ad a , it may m ean  e ith e r co n tra ry  to the law of the C o n ­
stitu tion , ultra vires, o r  co n tra ry  to the  conventions. For instance, an Act of 
a provincial L egislature d ealing  with bank ing  would be “u n co n stitu tio n ar ' 
bec ause it w ould violate section 91(15) o f  th e  Constitution Act, 18(»7. Likew ise, 
an Act of th e  P arliam ent of C an ad a  dealing  with m unicipal institu tions 
w ould be “u n co n stitu tio n a l” because it would violate section 92(H) of the  
Constitution Act, 18b7. But if a G o v ern m en t de fea ted  in the H ouse o f  C om -
'( ̂ institution A<t. I9H2. section 52(2) and Schedule I Anothei Bniish Ail whuh presumahU is |>.ut <>t mu 
written Constitution, .is lieing siib)ett to amendment onl\ )>\ seition 11 ot tilt- (.onstitutum \<t. I‘W2 (unaii- 
nnoiis consent ot the provîntes. situe it is "ill relation to the o ltu e  ot the Queen") is the t  ngh\h Ait nf 
Srttlrmrnt. 1701 Othei t nglish statutes, e g  . the 1‘rtitiiin <>/ Right. lo2N. the Hnbrn\ ('.¡»pu* \<t. I * > 7 ‘ * anil 
the Hill oI Right*. lt>M*l might tie tonsitieieii p.<11 ol out «Mitten Constitution. Inn uhethet the\ i.m  Ik- 
aiiienileti onlv lis (onstitution.il auieniiinent I leave to o th e is  V u e t qualified than I to |udge
-'tor a m oie elalxiiate statenient. see Freedman. < | . quoting Plolessot Hogg, m ( I'IMI ), I 17 I) I K ( it 1 ) 
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m ons (o r a provincial Legislative Assem bly) on  a m otion o f  cen su re  o r  w ant 
o f  confidence re fu sed  e ith e r  to resign  o r  to  ask fo r a d issolution  o f  Parlia­
m en t (o r th e  L egislature), th a t co n d u c t also w ould be “un co n stitu tio n a l”. 
It w ould be perfectly  legal; th e  co u rts  w ould  be pow erless to p rev en t o r 
p un ish  it. B ut it w ould be co n tra ry  to  a basic conven tion  o f  o u r  C onstitu tion , 
th e  conven tion  o f  responsib le  g o v e rn m en t.6 It w ould, to  quo te  a favourite  
expression  o f  th e  late R. B. B enne tt, “strike  at th e  very fo u n d a tio n  o f  o u r  
in stitu tions”.
NATURE AND SOURCES OF CONVENTIONS
W hat, if  any, is th e  function  o f  th e  co u rts  in re la tion  to  the  conventions?
B e fo re a tte m p tin g  to  answ er that question , it is necessary to  be clear 
ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  conventions, w here  they  a re  to  be fo u n d , an d  th e  crite ria  
fo r recognizing  them . First an d  fo rem ost, they are  political: political in 
th e ir  b irth , po litica l in th e ir  g row th  an d  decay, and  political in th e ir  a p ­
plication an d  sanctions. In politics thev live an d  m ove and  have th e ir  being.
Practicing politicians, faced with a new  prob lem , find tha t n e ith e r the 
law n o r the  estab lished  way o f  do in g  th in g s of fers any solution . So they trv 
som eth ing  new. If  it w orks, an d  th e  sam e prob lem  recu rs, they use it again; 
an d , som etim es quickly, som etim es g radua lly , it becom es generally  rec­
ognized an d  accepted . It it d o e sn ’t w ork, it’s d ro p p e d . If  the  p rob lem  which 
b ro u g h t it in to  being  d isap p ears , th e  conven tion  likewise d isappears. If the 
o ld p rob lem  recu rs, th e  conven tion  w hich solved it may rea p p e a r. In  sho rt, 
the  conven tions a re  essentially, an d  intensely , practical. They a re , acco rd ­
ingly, flexible an d  ad ap tab le .
W here  a re  they to  be found?
O ccasionally, in the  p ream bles o f  Acts o f  Parliam ent; fo r exam ple, the  
Constitution Act, 1867 an d  th e  S ta tu te  o f  W estm inster, 1931. Less occasion­
ally in the  reso lu tions o f  Im p eria l C o n feren ces, notably tha t o f  192b.7 Som e­
tim es, in th e  decisions o f  D om inion-provincial C onferences, o r  in official 
texts ag reed  on  by the  D om inion  a n d  th e  provinces, as in th e  Favreau 
W hite P ap er of 1965.H V ery  occasionally, in O rders-in -C ouncil, notably the 
C anad ian  O rd er-in -C o u n cil of May 1, 1896. anil its successors, on  the  
“p re roga tives” o f  the  P rim e M inister.'*
But m ainly, they a re  fo u n d  in p reced en ts : the  reco rd  of how various 
p roblem s have in fact been  dealt with. T h e  relevant p reced en ts  a re , o f  
course, p rim arily  C an ad ian , D om inion a n d  provincial, p re -C o n fed era tio n
*(1982). 125 D I R (3d) H.V 
Repart of the Imperuil ('.onfermrf. IV2f>. 12-13. 21.
*(>uv Kavreau. The I me ntt ment of the Constitution of l.anada ( I'Wifi)
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Central F.xecutive” 12 C.anuduin Journal of t.tonomus and Political Science, 2tiH-'l
an d  p o st-C o n fed era tio n . Som e o f  th e  p re -C o n fed e ra tio n  p reced en ts  have 
becom e obsolete; som e provincial p reced en ts  w ould alm ost certa in ly  be 
con sid ered  too  eccen tric  to  be re levan t, a t any ra te  beyond  th e  ju risd ic tio n  
w here  they  o c c u rre d .10 B ecause o u r  system  o f  g o v e rn m en t is based on  the  
B ritish, B ritish p reced en ts  m ay also be re levan t as may also those o f  the  
C om m onw ealth  co u n trie s  w here  sim ilar p ractices prevail. (Som e British, 
A ustra lian , New Z ealand , S ou th  A frican an d  N ew fo u n d lan d  p reced en ts  
m ay be irre lev an t because o f  p a rticu la r fea tu res  in th e  o th e r  C onstitu tions 
which have no  c o u n te rp a r t in C an ad a ; som e m ay have becom e obsolete; 
som e, again , m ay be too  eccen tric  to  be accep ted  h e re ) .11
O th e r  sources o f  conven tions m ay be fo u n d  in the  u tte ran ces o f  e m ­
inen t s ta tesm en and  the  w ritings o f  recognized  au th o ritie s  on  the  C onsti­
tu tion . T h e  c rite ria  fo r recogn izing  conven tions have been  succinctly stated  
by Sir Ivor Jennings:
We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the precedents, 
secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by 
a rule: and thirdlv, is there a reason for the rule?12
H e adds:
A single precedent with a good reason mav be enough to establish a rule.
A whole string of precedents will be of no avail, unless it is perfectly certain 
that the persons concerned regarded them(selves) as bound by it.1'
H e also says:
Conventions imply some form of agreement, whether expressed or im­
plied . . . I'he conventions are like most fundamental rules of any consti­
tution in that they rest essentially upon general acquiescence . . .  If the 
authoritv itself and those connected with it believe that they ought to do 
so, then the convention exists. T his is the ordinary rule applied to customarv 
law. Practice alone is not enough. It must be normative."
I w ould be inclined  to ad d  th a t conven tions rest u ltim ately  on  w hat Sir 
R obert B o rd en , too  optim istically  p e rh ap s , called “the  com m onp lace  quality  
o f  com m onsense".
SOME EXAMPLES OF CONVENTIONS
A few exam ples o f  conven tions an d  alleged conven tions may be in ­
structive bo th  in clarify ing  th e  fo reg o in g  an d  in ind ica ting  th e  lim its o f  the 
cou rts  in dea lin g  with them .
"'See. tor example*. Frank MacKinnon. The (>oi'rrnment of Prince h.duani hltirul (1951), 152-3, 173-4. IHH- 
9, 191-4; The Crown in Canada { I97t>). 1 12-13.
"Some mav be inapplicable either liecause ol varying constitutional features or simplv liecause the\ aie  
too eccentric. see. tor example. S | K Noel. 1‘olltu \ in Xrufoutuilatid  (1971), TJH-'l
vllh e  I.au and the Constitution. 5th ed ( 1959), Ml
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T h e  S u p rem e  C o u rt o f  C an ad a , in a m ajority  ju d g m e n t o f  S ep tem b er 
28, 1981 on  th e  p roposals  fo r p a tria tio n  o f  th e  C an ad ian  C o n stitu tion , gave 
one exam ple  o f  w hat has long  since been  a recogn ized  conven tion : “ It is a 
fu n d am en ta l re q u ire m e n t o f  th e  C onstitu tio n  th a t if  th e  O pposition  obtains 
a m ajority  a t th e  polls, th e  G o v ern m en t m ust resign  fo rth w ith ”.15
B ut in B ritain , till 1868, this s ta tem en t w ould have been  re g a rd e d  as 
th e  w ildest heresy . T ill th a t year, w hatever G o v ern m en t was in office w hen 
an election  took place invariably stayed in office till th e  new H ouse o f  
C om m ons m et, an d  resig n ed  only if  d e fea ted  in th a t H ouse on a m otion 
o f  cen su re  o r  w ant o f  confidence, o r  o th e r  vote th e  G o v ern m en t considered  
equ ivalen t to these. In  all th e  se lf-govern ing  colonies, th e  practice was the 
sam e. A ny o th e r  co u rse  w ould have been  con sid ered  alm ost, o r  qu ite , a 
co n tem p t o f  Parliam ent.
T h e n  in 1868, D israeli ab ru p tly  b roke  with p reced en t. T h e  election 
having  given th e  L iberals a c lear m ajority  o f  th e  seats, it w ould have been 
sh eer waste o f  tim e to  wait fo r th e  new H ouse  to  d efea t him . So he resigned  
fo rthw ith . T h is  was so clearly sensible th a t w hen th e  C onservatives won an 
abso lu te  m ajority  in 1874, G ladstone , if re lu c tan tly 16, follow ed D israeli’s 
exam ple . A nd so a new  practice  developed .
W hy was th e  p re -1868  invariab le  practice  ab ru p tly  ab an d o n ed , an d  its 
d irec t o pposite  follow ed in th re e  successive cases? B ecause th e  c ircu m stan ­
ces had  ch an g ed  drastically , an d  th e  old practice, perfectly  sensible, in d eed  
inevitable, in th e  o ld  c ircum stances, had  becom e ab su rd  in the new. B efore 
the R eform  Bill o f  1867, th e  B ritish franch ise  was restric ted , a n d  th e  elec­
to ra te  small. C an d id a tes  w ere generally  personally  know n to th e ir  electors, 
and , accord ingly , w ere elected  largely on  th e ir  ind iv idual m erits o r  th e ir  
ind iv idual p o pu larity . T h ey  m ight have generally  C onservative, o r W hig, 
o r  Radical proclivities. B ut they  w ere essentially in d e p e n d e n t gen tlem en: 
w hat S ir J o h n  A. M acdonald  called “loose fish.” T h e re  was no  party  o r ­
gan ization  to th re a te n  them  with d e fea t at th e  next election if they ch an g ed  
sides. A ccordingly, in th e  H ouse, they  voted as they  p leased , ch an g in g  sides 
from  issue to  issue; m oving  easily, an d  w ithou t d iscred it, from  party  to 
party . O ften , on  the  m orrow  o f  an  election , no o n e  cou ld  be su re  w h e th e r 
a p a rticu la r newly elected  M em ber w ould su p p o rt o r  o p pose  th e  G o v ern ­
m en t w hen the  new H ouse  m et. B oth sides m ight claim  him . T h e  u n c e r­
ta in ties w ere increased , fo r m o re  th an  a d ecad e  a fte r  1846, bv th e  ex istence 
o f th e  Peelites, w ho had  left the  C onservative party  w hen  Peel repea led  
th e  C orn  Laws.
By 1868, th e  Peelites w ere gone. Som e w ere d ead . Som e had  left public 
life. Som e had  gone over to  th e  L iberals, som e had  gone back to  th e  C o n ­
servatives. M oreover, the  househ o ld  su ffrag e  in tro d u ced  by the  R eform  
Bill o f  1867 had  g reatly  increased  th e  n u m b e r of voters. Few o f  th e  new
l4(1982), D.1..R (3d), 82; John P Mackintosh, The British C.abmet (1962). 172.
l6John Morlev, The l ife of William Ewart Gladstone (1903), II. 492-3.
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voters cou ld  know  th e  can d id a te  personally . So they  ten d ed  to vote for the 
party  ra th e r  th an  the  m an. T h e  cand idates, accordingly , ten d ed  to  be party  
m en ra th e r  th an  in d e p e n d e n t gen tlem en . In  sh o rt, the  “loose fish” d is­
a p p ea red .
I f  B ritain  had  been  able to  keep  a tw o-party  system , th e  new practice 
w ould have com pletely  su p e rsed ed  th e  old. But she w asn’t. T h e  “loose fish" 
w ere gone. B ut loose schools, o r  “shoals”, o f  fish took th e ir  place: first the  
Irish  N ationalists, th en  th e  L iberal U nionists, th en  the  L abour party . T h e  
sam e th in g  h a p p e n e d  in C an ad a  a fte r  1920: first th e  Progressives, then  the 
CCF, th en  Social C red it, th en  the  NDP.
In th e  B ritish election o f  1885, th e  L iberals a n d  the  C onservatives won 
exactlv the  sam e n u m b e r o f  seats. T h e  Irish  N ationalists held  the  balance 
o f  pow er, an d  no  o n e  was su re  w hich way they w ould vote w hen the  new 
H ouse m et. So th e  p re-1868  conven tion  cam e to  life again with a jerk. L ord 
Salisbury m et th e  new H ouse, an d  resigned  only w hen  it had  d e fea ted  him . 
In  the  election o f  1886, fo u g h t on  H om e Rule, th e  an ti-H o m e R ulers won 
such an overw helm ing  m ajority  th a t G ladstone  resigned  at once. In the 
1892 election, no  party  got a c lear m ajority . So L ord  Salisbury m et th e  new 
H ouse, an d  resigned  only a f te r  it had  d e fea ted  him . In the election o f  1923, 
again no  party  got a c lear m ajority  o f  th e  seats. So Mr. Baldwin met the 
new H ouse, an d  resigned  only a f te r  it had  d e fea ted  him . In C anada, in 
th e  election o f  1925, th e  K ing (Liberal) G overnm en t got 101 seats. th °  
C onservatives 116, th e  Progressives 24, L abour 3, an d  In d e p e n d e n ts  !. 
M r. K ing met th e  new H ouse, an d  was fo r som e m on th s susta ined  by it.
So now we have, in B rita in  an d  C an ad a , two conven tions on  the subject. 
If  an opposition  party  gets m o re  th an  m o re  th an  halt the  seats in a general 
election, the  G o v ern m en t m ust resign fo rthw ith . I f  no party  gets a m ajority, 
th en  th e  G o v ern m en t m ay resign p ro m p tly  (as M r. B aldw in did  in 19l'.9, 
an d  Mr. H ea th —a fte r  a b r ie f  abortive  a ttem p t to get the  Lib;jiu!« to join a 
coalition— in 1974 in B rita in , an d  as Mr. St. L au ren t d id  in 1957, Mr. 
D iefenbaker in 1963, a n d  M r. T ru d e a u  in 1979), o r  it may m eet the  new 
H ouse an d  let it decide  (as Mr. D iefenbaker d id  in 1962, an d  Mr. T rudeau  
in 1972).
An instance in which an old convention has been completely superseded 
by a new, both  in B ritain  an d  C anada , has to d o  with th e  P rem iersh ip . In 
B ritain , dow n to 1902, no o n e  w ould have d ream t o f  saying that it was a 
conven tion  o f  th e  C o nstitu tion  that the  Prim e M inister could  not Ik* a peer. 
Betw een 1832 and  1902, B ritain  had  eleven P rim e M inisters. Three w ere 
C o m m o n ers  th ro u g h o u t th e ir  p e riods in office: Peel, Palm erston  an d  (¿lad- 
stone. Six w ere in the  L ords th ro u g h o u t: G rey , M elbourne , Derby, A b er­
d een . Salisbury an d  R osebery. Russell a n d  Disraeli began in the  (Commons 
but e n d e d  in the  L ords. O v er th e  70-year p erio d , the  Prim e M inister was 
in the  L ords fo r nearly  30, an d  fo r 14 of th e  final 16.
But in 1924, w hen L ord  C u r /o n  confidently  expected  to becom e Prim e 
M inister on  th e  d ea th  of M r. B o n ar Law, the King exp la in ed  to him  that.
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with th e  L ab o u r party  now the  second party  in th e  state, th e  Prim e M inister 
m ust be in th e  C om m ons. In  1940, on  Mr. C ham b erla in ’s resignation , the  
K ing w ould  have liked to ask L ord  H alifax to form  a G overnm en t, placing 
his p e e ra g e  “in abeyance fo r th e  tim e being ,” an d  n e ith e r H alifax n o r 
anyone else co n cern ed  ap p a ren tly  th o u g h t his being in the  L ords an ob ­
stacle. B u t th e  K ing’s proviso  (curiously vague) shows th a t he clearly rec­
ognized  th e  conven tion , o r  the  realities o f  th e  situation , even if o th e rs  d id  
n o t.17 In  fact, o f  course, th e  L ab o u r party  w ould never have stom ached  a 
Prim e M inister in th e  Lords. H alifax was im possible.
By th e  tim e Mr. M acm illan resigned  the  P rem iersh ip , P arliam ent had  
passed th e  Peerage Act, 1963, allow ing peers to  ren o u n ce  th e ir  p ee rag es .18 
T h is  en ab led  L ord H om e to ren o u n ce  his ea rldom , seek a seat in the  H ouse 
o f  C om m ons, and  becom e Prim e M inister, as Sir Alec D ouglas-H om e.
In  C an ad a , in 1891, S en a to r Sir John A bbott becam e P rem ier on the 
d ea th  o f  S ir Jo h n  A. M acdonald; an d  in 1894, S enato r Sir M ackenzie Bowell 
becam e P rem ie r on th e  d ea th  o f  S ir Jo h n  T h o m p so n . In  1891, the  Liberals 
a ttacked  A bb o tt’s a p p o in tm en t on  th e  g ro u n d s  th a t he was too  close to  the  
C an ad ian  Pacific Railway.1'* But n e ith e r in 1891 n o r 1894 does anyone  seem 
to have even  suggested  tha t a P rim e M inister in the Senate was constitu ­
tionally im p ro p e r. W ith L ord  Salisbury as P rim e M inister in B ritain  in 1891, 
and  L ord  Roseberv in 1894, any such claim  w ould have been  looked upon  
as rid icu lous.
But it is safe to  say th a t in C an ad a  fo r m any years now it has been  a 
settled conven tion  tha t th e  Prim e M inister canno t be a S enato r. T h is was 
m ade c lear, fo r exam ple , in 1941, w hen the  C onservatives chose S enato r 
A rth u r  M eighen as leader. H e p ro m p tly  resigned  his sen a to rsh ip  and  ran  
fo r th e  H ouse  o f  C om m ons. In  C anada  it was not the  rise o f  a L abour 
party  w hich p ro d u ced  the  change , but the  grow th o f  dem ocratic  ideas, 
re in fo rced  by the  ch an g e  in British practice.
T w o  o th e r  conven tions w hich have changed  com pletely because o f  
ch an g in g  circum stances have to  d o  with the com position  o f  the  C anad ian  
C abinet.
At C o n fed e ra tio n , the  Irish  R om an C atholics w ere so large an d  fo r­
m idable a g ro u p , in all fo u r provinces, that everyone ag reed  that they had  
to  have at least one  M inister in th e  C abinet. The difficulty in m eeting  this 
re q u ire m e n t very nearly p rev en ted  Sir J o h n  A. M acdonald from  fo rm in g  
a G o v e rn m en t at all.20 It rem ain ed  a conventional req u irem en t in the fo r­
m ation  o f  G ov ern m en ts  till, certain ly , the 1960’s. But will anyone say th a t 
it li >lds now? Will an y o n e  sav that Mr. T ru d e a u  put M r. W helan o r Mr.
1 ■ K C S Wade and (>.(!. Phillips, Constitutional I m u '. Hth ed. (1969), X2-3
k en , Ih r  Constitutional History of Siodfrti Hnltnn Smrr U N I, 9ih. ed. (I9H9). 4H7.
^Drhatr* of thr Housr of (ommoris of the Dominion of Catuuia. l89 l,< o ls . I l<H>-09(Laurier), 1123-4 (Carlwright), 
1129 (Mills), I I4f>-t> (Davies).
-■"Donald ( .leigh lon  John .A MatdotuiU. Ihr ) oung I'olituuin (l9Wi), 473-4
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R egan o r  M r. M acG uigan in to  th e  C ab inet because th e re  h ad  to be a t least 
one  Irish  R om an C atholic M inister? As long  as th e  Irish  R om an C atholics 
w ere a real political force, this was a conven tion  o f  the  C anad ian  C onsti­
tu tion . W hen they ceased to  be such a force, th a t conven tion  d isap p eared .
O n th e  o th e r  h an d , a t C o n fed e ra tio n , an d  fo r m ore  th an  fifty years 
a fte r, no  o n e  th o u g h t o f  even suggesting  th a t every C ab inet m ust have at 
least one F rench -speak ing  M inister from  o u tside  Q uebec. In  1926, M r. 
M eighan ap p o in ted  th e  first one ; Dr. R aym ond M orand , from  W 'indsor, 
O n tario . Since th en , every C ab inet excep t Mr. B en n e tt’s (and  Mr.' D iefen- 
b ak e r’s fo r m ost o f  its life) has had  at least one. T h e  p resen t C abinet has 
th ree . For th e  first h a lf-cen tu ry  o f  C o n fed e ra tio n . F rench -speak ing  C a­
nad ians o u tside  Q uebec w ere politically negligible. T h ey  w ere too  few, too 
inarticu late , too  u n o rg an ized . As th e ir  n u m b ers , th e ir  articu la teness and  
th e ir  cohesiveness grew , they becam e a political force, increasingly fo r­
m idable. Now it is m ost certa in ly  a conven tion  o f  o u r  C onstitu tion  that they 
m ust have at least one  M inister. It is no tew orthy  that M r. C lark , with his 
very slim F rench -C anad ian  su p p o rt, nonetheless pu t M r. de  C o tre t in to  
the  C abinet, even th o u g h  he had  to find him  a seat in the  Senate  to  d o  it.
In B ritain , the  office o f  P rim e M inister is wholly conven tional, in C an ­
ada alm ost wholly. But in bo th  cou n tries , since th e  beg inn ing  o f  the  tw en­
tieth  cen tu ry , the  ¡sowers o f  th e  office have ch an g ed  eno rm ously ; in Britain 
wholly, in C an ad a  alm ost wholly, by convention .
In B ritain , w here fo rm erly  th e  Prim e M inister was primus niter pares, 
o r, in Sir W illiam H a rc o u rt’s p h rase , inter \tellas luna mmores, he (or she) is 
now unquestionably  m aste r (or m istress) to  a d eg ree  that w ould have stag­
g ered  G ladstone  o r  Salisbury. A single exam ple  is tha t, dow n to 1918, 
dissolution  o f  P arliam ent was a lm ost invariably on  the  advice o f  th e  C abinet, 
a lte r  discussion in C abinet. Since 1918, it is on the  advice o f  th e  Prim e 
M inister a lo n e .21
In C anada , till 1957, d isso lu tion  was, form ally  and  explicitly, “by an d  
with the advice an d  consen t o f  O u r  Privy C ouncil fo r C an ad a” (that is, the 
C ab in e t) ."  Since th en , the  advice to  the  G overn o r-G en era l is no  longer by 
O rder-in -C ouncil, em b ody ing  th e  o p in io n  of the  C abinet, but by “in s tru ­
m ent o f  advice”, a d o cu m en t em an a tin g  from , an d  signed by, th e  Prim e 
M inister a lone; an d  the P roclam ation  of d issolution  now reads: “by an d  
with the  advice an d  consen t o f  O u r  P rim e M inister o f  C a n a d a ”. T h e  sam e 
th ing  has h a p p e n e d  to th e  “C onvocation  of P arliam ent" (w hich, till 1963 
at least, was “by an d  with th e  advice an d  consent o f  O u r  Privy C ouncil for 
C an ad a”), an d  the  a p p o in tm e n t o f  S enato rs (w hich, till 1976, was advised 
by th e  C ab inet).”
-'Nil Ivor jennings. Cabinet (iovernment. Sri. «•(! (1969). 117-11)
l i . \  ( .u u l f  In  (  a iu id w n  M in is t r ie s  \ in t e  ( . n n fe d e r a l io n . / u h  I .  t S h 7 / a m u m  I ,  I W 7 I I‘*"»7 ). |> ti'J. S u p p le m e n t,  
/anuan  I, /V 57 August I. IVb* (1966). V
1''l)ebate\ of the House »/ < ommom of the Dominion of (.tnuuia. I94H Iumrv iscd). MiH. intoi m.ition from the 
I'rtv v ( .oniu tl ( )ttu e
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In  this instance, th e  ch an g e  seem s to  have been  b ro u g h t abo u t by a 
coup de plume, based on  a m is-read ing  o f  an  O rd er-in -C ouncil first passed 
by th e  G o v ern m en t o f  Sir C harles T u p p e r  on  May 1, 1896, s.nd rep ea ted  
by Sir W ilfrid  L au rie r on Ju ly  13, 1896; S ir R obert B o rd en  (with one  m ino r 
d eletion  because th e  com m ittee  co n ce rn ed  had  ceased to  exist) on  O ctober 
10, 1911; M r. M eighen on  Ju ly  19, 1920; M r. B en n e tt (with a very slight 
change in w ord ing  in o n e  clause) on  A ugust 7, 1930; an d  M r. K ing on 
O ctober 25, 1935. T h is  O rd e r  set fo rth , inter alia, th a t “certa in  reco m m en ­
dations a re  th e  special p re ro g a tiv e  o f  th e  Prim e M inister”. A m ong  them  
are  the  d isso lu tion  an d  su m m o n in g  o f  P arliam en t a n d  th e  a p p o in tm en t o f 
S enato rs.24
But th e  O rders-in -C ouncil co n cern ed  have n o th in g  w hatever to do  with 
advice to th e  Covernor-Cetieral. W hat they deal with is “recommendations'' to 
“Council" (the  C abinet). T h e  clause im m ediately  p reced in g  th e  one  on  d is­
solution o f  P arliam ent m akes this crystal clear: “A M inister canno t m ake 
recommendations to  Council a ffec ting  th e  d iscip line o f  a n o th e r  d e p a r liiic.U 
(italics m ine). Besides, “reco m m en d a tio n ” is th e  s ta n d a rd  w ord used in 
O rders-in -C ouncil fo r so m eth ing  b ro u g h t fo rw ard  by a particular Minister 
fo r adoption by the Cabinet: “T h e  C om m ittee  o f  th e  Privy Council [the C ab­
inet], on th e  recommendation of the  M inister o f" such-and-suc h, “advise" thus- 
and-so. T h e  Minister recommends to Council. the  Council advises the  G overnor- 
G eneral. In d eed , th e  very O rd e rs  at issue begin: “T h e  Committee of the Privy 
Council, on th e  recommendation of" So-and-So, “the Prime Minister, subm it". 
T h e  recommendation was m ade to  the  Cabinet bv th e  Prime Minister, an d  the 
C abinet hav ing  accepted  it. the* decision o f  th e  Cabinet was then  submitted to 
the G overn o r-G en era l fo r his app roval. W hat was ap p ro v ed  by the  G ov­
e rn o r-G en era l was a M inute  of Council, tran sm itted , ol course, by th e  Prim e 
M inister; not th e  “advice” of the* Prime Minister.
Plainlv, also at least som e o f  th e  a p p o in tm en ts  which a re  described  as 
“the  special p re ro g a tiv e” o f  the  Prim e M inister a re  still m ade by O rd er-in - 
C ouncil; that is, on  the  advice o f  the  Cabinet (having, o f  course, first been 
recommended to  the  Cabinet by the  P rim e M inister). A notab le  exam ple  is: 
“D eputy H eads o f  D epartm en ts".
T h e se  partic u la r  ag g ran d isem en ts  o f  th e  pow er of th e  C anad ian  Prim e 
M inister seem  to have passed alm ost u n n o ticed , an d  u n ch a llen g ed ,25 an d  
are  certa in ly  now estab lished , recognized  conven tions o f  th e  C anad ian  C o n ­
stitu tion .
A n o th e r conven tion  which has u n d e rg o n e  drastic  change both  in B rit­
ain and  C an ad a  as a result of c han g in g  c ircum stances is tha t govern ing  the 
C row n’s choice o f  P rim e M inister. I 'he  classic n in e teen th  (and early tw en­
tieth) cen tu ry  d o c trin e  was tha t, if  a P rim e M inister d ies in office, o r  resigns 
for persona l reasons (such as ill health , leaving his party  still in pow er) the
'^Heenev. lof rii
'’'fcxiept bv me!
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Q ueen  o r  h e r  rep resen ta tiv e , a f te r  consu ltin g  lead ing  m em bers o f  the  partv , 
and  p e rh ap s  e ld e r  sta tesm en , chooses his successor; that a re tirin g  Prim e 
M inister is no t en titled  to  p ro ffe r  advice as to  his successor; tha t even if, 
at the  C ro w n ’s request, h e  gives such advice, it is not b in d in g .2*’ But in 
B ritain , now , if  a L ab o u r Prim e M inister res ig n ed  fo r personal reasons, 
the  L abour p arty  has th e  m ach inery  fo r p ro m p tly  e lecting  a new leader, 
whom  the  Q u een  w ould have to  call u p o n  to  becom e P rim e M inister; and  
if a C onservative P rim e M inister resigned  fo r personal reasons, th e  C o n ­
servative p artv  now has th e  m ach inery  fo r e lec ting  a new lead er p rom ptly , 
and  the  Q u een  w ould have to  call u p o n  him  (or her). Sim ilarly, in C anada, 
now that partv  leaders a re  chosen In national conven tions (not, as befo re  
1919 fo r th<* Liberals an d  1927 fo r th e  C onservatives, bv th e  p a r t\  caucus), 
if a Liberal o r  C onservative Prim e M inister resigned  lo r  personal reasons, 
he w ould not d o  so till a f te r  his p arty , in a na tional conven tion , had  already  
chosen a new leader, w hom  the  G ov ern o r-G en era l w ould th en  au to m a ti­
cally call u p o n  to fo rm  a new G o v ern m en t.
In B rita in , now. if th e  Prim e M inister d ied , his (or h er) p a r t\  would 
im m ediately  elect a new lead er w ho w ould a u to m a t ic a l  be called on  to 
form  a G o v ernm en t. In C anada, on  th e  o th e r  h and , il a Prim e M inister 
d ied , tht* o ld  practice  w ould still have to be follow ed. It w ould take m onths 
fo r the* partv  in pow er to  choose a new leader. But a new Prim e M inister 
w ould have to be a p p o in te d  im m ediately . So th e  G overn o r-G en era l would 
have to  take so u nd ings am o n g  the* lead ing  m em bers of the  partv  to  set* 
which of th em  w ould be* most likelv to be able to com m and  a majoritx till 
tlu* new lead e r had  been  chosen. T h e  party  m ight, of course , sim plify his 
task In ho ld ing  a cauc us whic h w ould elec t an in terim  leader.
( )l cou rse  it rem ains true* that a re tir in g  Prim e M inister has no l ight 
to nam e his successor. It w ould be* p rep o ste ro u s  that a d e fea ted  Liberal 
P rim e M inister shou ld  be* able to advise tlu* G o v ern o r-G en era l to se*n<l for 
som e C onservative o th e r  th an  th e  lead er of the* victorious C onservative 
partv . Mr. M ackenzie King, a f te r  being soundly  d e fea ted  in the  genera l 
election of 1930, an n o u n c e d  that he had  “advised" the* G overno r-G enera l 
to send  fo r M r. B ennett. But he had  no shadow of ligh t to d o  an y th in g  of 
ihe* sort, an d  I am  reliably in fo rm ed  that the* sailorly com m en ts of King 
G eorge V on  read in g  this eg reg io u s an n o u n cem en t lelt n o th in g  to be* d e ­
sired.
( )f cou rse  also it rem ains tru e  that il a Prime* M inister tesigns because 
his p a rt\ b reaks up . th e  Q u een  oi tlu- ( »ovei not -(»enei .il w ill h.«\e to c boose 
his successoi (a lte i such so u nd ings an d  consu lta tions .is m a\ seem  neces­
sary), as George* VI d id  w hen M r. C ham berla in  resigned , o r «is the* Gov­
e rn o r-G en era l. here*, w ould lia \e  had  to to il d issension in the* Libei.il partv 
in 1944 had  forced  M r. King to resign. (M r. K ing's c out cut ion, at the* time*,
•i,,Sii Kolx-rt HokIcii. in | K M allnn. I hr Slrutlurr of < an/uiuin (im n tim rn t ( 1971 ). 74 Him H crlx il H iuir. 
m Drhfitri of the Hoii^r of ( ommoru of ihr Dominion of ( utuulti. 1944. ÙH2S-4
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that he cou ld  not resign u n less he was in a position  to tell the G overnor-  
G eneral w hom  to ap poin t ar> is successor, is. o f cou rse, n on sen se .)-7
S om e p eo p le  have su ggested  that Mr. Pearson’s action in retain ing  
office  u p on  his G o v ern m en t’s d efeat in the H ou se of C om m on s on  a Fi­
nance Bill, in 1968, instead  of resign in g , or  ask ing for a d isso lu tion  of 
Parliam ent, is an exam p le  of a con ven tion  b ein g  su p ersed ed  b ecause o f  
ch an g in g  circum stances. This is not so. A G overn m en t d efea ted  in the  
H ou se o f  C om m on s on  an exp licit m otion  o f  cen su re or  want o f  con fid en ce  
(which in clu d es d efeat on  th e B u dget m otion , as phrased  in C anada) m ust, 
o f  cou rse, e ith er resign  or ask for a d isso lu tion  of Parliam ent; and a G ov­
ern m en t can always ch o o se  to con sid er  d efea t on  anv m otion , even  .1 m ere  
m otion  to ad jou rn , as tantam ou nt to d efea t 011  a m otion  o f  cen su re or want 
o f  con fid en ce . But a G overn m ent d efea ted  on  an yth in g  but an explicit 
m otion  of cen su re  or  want o f  con fid en ce  n eed  n eith er resign nor ask for 
a d isso lu tion  of Parliam ent. Sir Joh n  A. M acdonald's G overn m ent was 
d efea ted  ten or a d ozen  tim es in the Inst six years after C on fed eration , 
and n eith er resign ed  nor asked  for a d isso lu tion  of Parliam ent.*8 In Britain, 
in very recent years. G overn m en ts have been  d efea ted  in the H ou se of 
C om m on s scores of tim es, and have neither resign ed  nor asked for .1 d is­
solution.
T h e  S u p rem e ( an itt o f  C anada, in its judgm ent of S ep tem b er 2N. 1981. 
said that. In co n v en tio n , th e Q u een , the G overn or-G en eral and the Lieu­
ten ant-G overnors cou ld  not, “of their ow n m otion ”, exerc ise their legal 
pow er to refu se  assent “to anv bill passed In the- two H ou ses of Parliam ent 
or by a provincial A ssem bly, as the case max be, . . . on  the- g rou n d , foi 
instance that thev d isap p rove of the- policy of such bill”.*" Sit joint A. 
M acdonald , in 1882, went even  farther: “T h e  pow ei of veto In the Crown  
is now ad m itted  to be ob so lete  and practically non-existent" .*1
But Professor McVVhinney, in Ins recent book, Canada and tin- Consti­
tution, 1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 2 , su ggests that this con ven tion , and o thers, have been  
ren d ered  ob so lete , at least for the G overn or-G en eral. In the fact that that 
p ersonage is no lon ger  an ’a lien ’ (British and “im perially appointed").
“ I lie * Limit'd » mi \ tin 101 is 111.11 would o\ei i ide I lit- positive law powers ol 
the govei not -genet a I 1 est on t wo t out I it ions no longei applu ahle; in ( anada 
the poweis are 110 longei exenised (as in the past) l>\ an alien ot (as in 
Bi itain) b\ a hereditary mon.iK It. I lie go\et not -I'enet al is a 11111\ ( anadian 
office-holder, and. unlike the Kinisli nion.mli, he lias lus position loi a 
limited tei in only. Me ma\ well tout lude tli.it lie lias .1 («institutional le^n- 
imae\ in Ins own 1 i^lit. and tli.it lie has Ins own lole to |>la\ as |>.111 ot the
K̂iiKen«- hirsfv, Frttdum and Ordtr (1947). 88-‘i 
iHtbid . 123-8
'-"'Philip Norton. I.IX Thr Parliamtntanan. 232-4 
,"(I982| 125 I) / H (3d), 85.
’'trank Maikiimon, I hr (iin’rmmmt of Pnnrr Fdward Islam!. 154-5; Ihminwu Ptnx’imuil l.rgi\laltt»i. lMt>7 
I8‘H> (18'«)). 7h. Srwwnut f*aptr\ (( anada). 1924, No 27*> (not p i i
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system of checks and balances if the need for the exercise of his legal powers 
should arise in his own, proper constitutional judgment . . . Win should not 
a Canadian governor-general who is hoth a Canadian citi/en and also ef­
fectively appointed by the government of Canada, exercise the reserve, 
discretionary, prerogative powers conferred upon him l>\ the BN A Act 
(sections 50 and 54-7)?’’’-
B efore  exam in ing  the  precise app lication  of these con ten tions, two 
p re lim inary  com m en ts a re  in o rd e r . First, what “system of checks and  
balances”? T h is is a basic fea tu re  of th e  U n ited  States C onstitu tion , with 
its separa tion  o f  pow ers. It is n o  p a rt o f  ou rs. A re we l)eing asked to  accept 
it as a substitu te  fo r responsib le  g overnm en t?  Second, what is the  fo u n ­
dation  fo r saying th a t the  “claim ed conven tions" rested  on the  G overnor- 
G en era l’s having been fo rm erly  a residen t of th e  U nited  K ingdom  and  
ap p o in ted  by the  U nited  K ingdom  G overnm en t? ; o r on the fact that his 
office ts not h ered ita ry ?  Is th e re  a single C an ad ian  Prim e M inister in out 
whole history  w ho w ould have said: “O h! if the h e re d ita n  m onarch , o r  a 
B ritish-appointed G overnor-G eneral, exercised of his own m otion the powci 
to dissolve P arliam ent, o r  th e  pow er to re fu se  to recom m end  an  e x p e n d ­
itu re  to  the  H ouse o f  C om m ons; o r  if a B ritish -appo in ted  G o v ern o r-G en ­
eral exercised  the  pow er to  re fu se  assent, o r  to reserve bills for the  
signification of the  Q u e e n ’s p leasu re , that would never do. I hat would 
violate responsib le  g o v ern m en t. But if a C anad ian  G overno r-G enera l. C a­
n ad ian -ap p o in ted . with a lim ited te rm , d id  these th ings, th e re  could  be no 
ob jection”? T h e  concept of responsib le  C abinet governm ent is p e r fe ith  
distinct from  the concept of C an ad ian  self-governm ent.
W hat th e  G o verno r-G enera l's  being  now a ( Canadian ( iti/en . ( i.m adi.in­
ap p o in ted , and  not h e red ita ry , has to  d o  witli the  conventions govern ing  
the exercise of the  pow ers in sections 50 an d  54-7 of the  C onstitu tion  Act. 
1867, is a m ystery to me. W hat is not a mvsierv is that tlu- exert ise  of the 
pow er to veto, and  these o th e r  pow ers, In the  G overno r-G enera l <>l his 
own m otion , w ould en d  responsib le  g o v ern m en t. I he evolution  ol C an a­
d ian  sovereignty  has m ade som e conven tions of earlie r tim es obsolete. 
R esponsible g o v ern m en t is not o n e  of them .
Now fo r the  details. Section 50 em pow ers the  C overnot -Gene ral to 
dissolve Parliam ent. H e already  has a reserve powet to refuse d issolution 
in certa in  very special c ircu m stan ces .“  l o  concede him the  powet to d i s ­
solve of his own m otion w ould be lo put responsib le governm en t .u I n s  
m ercy. Section 54 m akes it “unlaw fill” fo r th e  H ouse ot C om m ons “to ad< *|>i 
o r pass anv Vole. R esolution. A ddress ot Bill to r  th e  A pprop i ialioti ol am  
part o f  th e  Public R evenue, o r  of anv fax  o r  Im post, to anv Put pose that 
has no t first reco m m en d ed  to that H ouse In M essage ot the  G o v e in o i- 
G eneral”. Ifthe* G overnor-G eneral tou ld . in the exert ise ot "his own. pro|>er.
,z<iyH2>. iso
Mfcugcne Forsey. I he Hiiyal Power <>/ Dissolution »/ 1‘arltumenl in ihr Hutish < nmmnuurnlth I I ‘HiM \<>u- also 
the (jovernm ent’s White 1‘apet I he Constitution anil the People <>/ (tinndu  ( l ‘H»‘l|. •>•>. 7t>. and llu- ( .ow i iimrnt >. 
Bill C-60. 1478. clause .r>S
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constitu tional ju d g m e n t”, ref use to  send  the  m essage, he could  p reven t any 
e x p e n d itu re  he d isap p ro v ed  of. H e could , in effect, s top  Supply. W hat 
Prim e M inister, w hat C ab inet, w hat H ouse o f  C om m ons, w hat e lectorate, 
w ould ever accept that? O n  th e  o th e r  pow ers in sections 54-7, 1 com m ent 
below.
T h e  d issen ting  o p in io n  in the  patria tio n  re fe ren ce  case says th e re  is 
“the  ru le  th a t a f te r  a g enera l election th e  G o v ern o r-G en era l will call upon  
the  leader o f  th e  party  with th e  g rea test n u m b e r o f  seats to  form  a gov­
e rn m e n t”.*4 This is no t a lo g e th e r accurate. If th e  G overnm en t in office 
gets a c lear m ajority  o f  th e  seats, it sim ply stavs in of fice. T h e re  is no occasion 
fo r the  G o v ern o r-G en era l to  call u p o n  anyone. If an  opposition  party  gets 
a clear m ajority , th en , as the  m ajority  ju d g m e n t in the sam e case correctly  
says, the  G o v ern m en t resigns fo rthw ith , an d  th e  G overno r-G enera l calls 
on  the lead er o f  th e  party  with a c lear m ajority  to  form  a G overnm en t. If 
no party  gets a c lear m ajority , th en  th e  G o v ern m en t in of fice, even if it has 
few er seats th an  th e  official O p p o sition , o r som e th ird  party , is en titled  to 
m eet the  new H ouse of C om m ons an d  let it d ec ide  w h e th e r to keep  the 
G overnm en t in o r th row  it ou t. M r. King's action  on the  m orrow  o f  the 
election o f  1925 is conclusive on  this.
Im m ediately a f te r  the  election of 1972, w hen, fo r a few days, ii looked 
as if the  C onservatives w ould have 109 seats to  the  Liberals' 107. th e re  was 
a considerab le  ch o ru s  of voices claim ing  that th e  ( ¿overnor-G eneral should  
call on Mr. S tanfield to form  a G overnm en t. In fact, ii would have been 
grossly im p ro p e r  for him  to  d o  so. In sue h a case, ii is not fo r the G overnor- 
G enera l to  decide  w ho shall fo rm  the G o v ernm en t. It is fo r the  newly 
elected  H ouse o f  C om m ons, an d  the G overn o r-G en era l has no right w hat­
ever to u su rp  its au thority  . (H ad  the  ( iovern o r-G en era l, in N ovem ber 1925, 
dism issed M r. King (w hose party , be it rem em b ered , had  101 seals, while 
Mr. M eighen 's had 1 10), an d  asked Mr. M eighen to form  a G overnm en t, 
he m ight very well have fo u n d  that th e  new H ouse  of C om m ons w ould 
have d e fea ted  M r. M eighen an d  he would have had  to recall Mr. King. In 
am  event, the  welkin w ould have ru n g , and  properly  , with d en u nc ia tions 
of th e  unconstitu tionality  of His Kxcellcnc v s  in te rven tion .)
Only ii M r. King, in 1925-20, o r  Mr. T ru d e a u  in 1972-73. had a t­
tem pted  to carry on lot an e x ten d ed  period  w ithout (a iling  Parliam ent 
(financing the  co u n try 's  business by m eans of G overno r-G enera l s special 
w arran ts) w ould His Kxcellencv have had  the  tig h t, indeed  the du ty , to 
insist on the  sum m o n in g  of P arliam ent. H e w ould have had  to refuse  to 
sign any m ore  special w arran ts; if th e  Prim e M inister had still re fused  to 
advise the  sum m o n in g  of P arliam ent, the  G o v ern o r-G en era l would have 
had  to dism iss him  an d  call on the* leader of the* largest patty to form  a 
G overnm en t an d  advise th e  sum m oning . In tak ing  this action, he w ould 
not have been u su rp in g  the  right of th e  H ouse of C om m ons to (fee ide w ho 
should  form  the G overn m en t: he w ould have been p reserv ing  its tigh t to 
do  so.
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1 have used th e  p h ra se  “fo r an  e x ten d ed  p e r io d ”. W hat does th a t m ean? 
But, if th e  newly elected  H ouse o f  C om m ons w ere not su m m o n ed  for, say, 
th ree  m on ths, o r  fo u r, o r  five, o r  six, at som e po in t th e re  w ould Ik* a public 
outcry: “R esponsible g o v ern m en t m eans g o v ern m en t by a C abinet with a 
m ajority in the  H ouse  of C om m ons. Has this G overnm en t a m ajority  in 
the  H ouse o f  C om m ons? T h e  only way to find ou t is to sum m on Parliam ent 
and  let th e  H ouse vote. If this G o v ern m en t w on’t advise tb.it action , then  
we’d b e tte r get a G o v e rn m en t that will, an d  it’s the  d u ty  of the  G overnor- 
G enera l to see tha t we d o  get it. His action is o u r  only p ro tec tion  against 
a gross violation o f  responsib le  g o v e rn m e n t”.
T h e re  a re  a n u m b e r o f  practices which may o r m ay not have acqu ired  
th e  status o f  constitu tional conventions. O ne  is the  a lte rn a tio n , since 1944, 
o f  the  C h ie f Justicesh ip  o f  C anada , betw een F rench -speak ing  an d  English- 
speak ing  Justices. B efore  1944, th e re  had  been  only one  F rench-speak ing  
C h ie f Ju stice  (th e re  h ad  been  also o n e  E nglish-speaking  Q uebec Civil Law 
C h ief Justice). Plainly, in the  first six ty-nine years o f  the  C o u rt's  existence, 
th e re  was no a lte rn a tio n . Since 1944, th e re  has been. I have h ea rd  it sug ­
gested th a t this is sim ply th e  resu lt o f  follow ing an estab lished  practice that, 
w hen the  C h ie f Ju sticesh ip  fell vacant, the  sen io r p u isne  judge succeeds. 
But in fact th e re  was no  such estab lished  practice. In 1906, Sir C harles 
F itzpatrick w ent s tra igh t from  M inister o f  Ju stice  to C h ie f Justice ; in 1924, 
Mr. Ju stice  A nglin was no t the sen io r pu isne  judge; not was M r. Justice  
Laskin in 1973.
T h a t the  a lte rn a tio n  since 1944 is sim ply accidental o r co incidental, I 
find it h a rd  to believe. It seem s to m e at least a rguab le  that its persistence 
is one o f  the  resu lts o f  the  Q uie t R evolution which tran sfo rm ed  Q uebec 
an d  Q uebec-D om in ion  re la tionsh ips. P erhaps we have h e re  an exam ple  of 
the  tru th  o f  Sir Ivor J e n n in g s ’ d ic tu m  that, w here  th e re  is a good reason , 
a single p reced en t (let a lone  a series over a period  of alm ost forty  vears) 
may suffice to establish a co nstitu tiona l ru le.
T h e  D om inion G o v e rn m e n t’s s ta tu to ry  pow er to disallow provincial 
Acts*5 has no t been  used  since 1943 (th o u g h  th e  th re a t of disallow ance was 
effectively used in 194H to take th e  stu ffing  ou t of the  Prince E dw ard Island 
T ra d e  U nion  Act of tha t year),*’ desp ite  the  fact th a t th e re  have been 
several occasions w hen earlie r G o v ern m en ts  w ould have fo u n d  s trong  
g ro u n d s  fo r using it. Is th e  pow er now  constitu tionally  obsolete? Is th e re  
now a conven tion  w hich p rec ludes its use?
T h e  case fo r saying, “ Yes”, w ould be s tro n g e r it the  Constitution Act, 
1982, had  not left th e  s ta tu to ry  pow er u n to u ch ed . If such a convention  
had  ex isted , h e re  was a go lden  o p p o rtu n ity  for p u ttin g  the  obsolescence 
of the  pow er beyond d o u b t by sim ply abolishing it. ! he provinces surely 
w ould not have ob jected , an d  th e  D om inion G o v ern m en t bad  repeatedly  
ind icated  that it was p re p a re d  to give up  th e  pow er in re tu rn  fo r a  C h a rte r
"f .omtitutmn Aft, IMf>7. sections !>b and 9*»
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o f  Rights. It got th e  C h a rte r  (albeit with a “n o tw ith stan d in g ” clause); it 
ap p aren tly  m ad e  no  a ttem p t to  ge t th e  pow er abolished. T h is  certain ly  
suggests th a t it is no t willing to  ad m it th a t th e re  is a conven tion  against its 
exercise; w hich w ould m ean  th a t Jen n in g s’ th ird  c rite rio n  has not been  
m et.
T h e  1982 Constitution Act's re ten tio n  o f  th e  D om inion pow er o f  d is­
allow ance o f  provincial Acts (and th e  L ieu ten an t-G o v ern o rs ' pow er to re ­
serve provincial bills fo r th e  G o v ern o r-G en era l’s p leasu re , to which th e  
sam e com m ents apply) is m atched  bv its re ten tio n  ot th e  G overnor-G en- 
e ra l’s pow er to  reserve D om inion bills fo r th e  signification o f  the  Q u een 's  
p leasure , an d  th e  B ritish G o v ern m en t's  pow er to  disallow  provincial Acts. 
Section 57 o f  th e  Constitution Act, I8b7. p rov ides tha t a reserved  D om inion 
bill dies unless w ithin two years it receives th e  assent o f  th e  Q u een  of the  
United Kingdom  in h e r United Kingdom  Privy C ouncil, of w hich th e re  is now 
not one  single C anad ian  m em ber. Section 5b of the  18t>7 A d  p rovides that 
a C anad ian  Act, to  w hich th e  G o v ern o r-G en era l has assen ted  in the Q u een 's  
nam e, can, w ithin two years of its en ac tm en t, be w iped of f th e  sta tu te  books 
In the  Q u een  of the  United Kingdom  in h e r United Kingdom  Privv C ouncil.
Till 1982, th e re  was unquestionab ly  a conven tion  that these pow ers 
w ere constitu tionally  obsolete. It was not merely that no D om inion bill had 
been reserved  since 18<X(j, an d  no  D om inion Act disallow ed sincc liS7.‘i. 
1 h ere  was also the- u n an im o u s, clear, au th o rita tiv e , unchallenged  p ro n ­
o uncem en t of the  1929 Im peria l ( o n fe re n c e  on  the  ( )p e ra tio n  ot D om inion 
Legislation an d  M erchant >t ipp in g  Legislation. I hat body declared  that 
reservation  could  be exerc ised only “in .itcordanc e with constitu tional p rac ­
tice in the* D om inion g o vern ing  the* exerc iso of the powet s of tlie* G overnor- 
G eneral", an d  th.it “it w ould not be in accordance  with constitu tional p rac ­
tice for advice to be te n d e re d  to His Majesty by His Majesty ’s G overnm ent 
in the- I n ited  K ingdom  against the  views of th e  G overnm en t of the  Do­
m in io n ”. It also said tha t “the p resen t constitu tional position is that the  
pow er of d isallow ance can no  lo n g er be exercised  in re la tion  to D om inion 
legislation ”. F u rth e r , it d ec la red  that "it would be in accordance  with co n ­
stitu tional practice  that if so req u ested  bv th e  D om inion . . . the G o v ern ­
m ent of th e  I n ited  K ingdom  shou ld  ask Parliam ent to pass the* necessary 
legislation” to abolish both p o w ers .1"
T h e  G o v ern m en t could  easily have got rid  of both pow ers in the Ac t 
of 1982, sim ply by ad d in g , in the first S chedule, opposite  “British N orth  
A m erica Act, 1867”, this: “(5) Section 55 is a m en d ed  bv strik ing  ou t all the  
w ords a fte r  the  w ords ‘w ithholds th e  Q u e e n ’s A ssent’. (6) Section 56 is 
repealed . (7) Section 57 is re p e a le d ’’.*4 W hy d id  it not do  so? P erhaps 
because this would have abolished also the L ieu ten an t-G o v ern o rs’ pow er
'•’Prank MacKinnon. Thr (.town in (anudti.
'('.on frrm tr on thr Operation of Dominion legislation and Mrrthanl Shipping l egislation. 1‘1‘J‘t. Ih. 19, 20  
Abolition could no* I* accomplished onU null thr unanimous consent ot the pinvmcial Legislatures, 
under section 11 ot itic ( ¡institution \<t. I9H2
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to reserve provincial bills fo r th e  G o v ern o r-G en era l’s p leasu re  and  the 
D om inion G o v e rn m en t’s pow er to  disallow provincial Acts, unless th e re  
had  been a consequen tia l am e n d m e n t to  section 90, w hich co n fers  these 
pow ers bv re fe ren ce  to  sections 55-57. If so. this confirm s the  view that the 
D om inion G o v ern m en t is no t p re p a re d  to adm it the  ex istence of a consti­
tu tional conven tion  p rec lu d in g  th e  use of its pow er of disallow ance of 
provincial Acts (o r th e  L ieu ten an t-G o v ern o rs’ use of th e ir  pow er of re ­
serving provincial bills).
Is this discussion n o th in g  m o re  th an  a rg u in g  how m ain  angels can 
stand  on th e  po in t o f  a needle? Surely evervone w ould ag ree  that the  
conventions set fo rth  by th e  Im peria l C o n fe ren ce  of 1929 still hold , and  
that fo r all practical p u rp o ses the  G o v ern o r-G en era l's  pow er to reserve  bills 
for th e  Q u e e n ’s p leasu re , and  th e  pow er of the  Q ueen-in -C ouncil to d is­
allow D om inion Acts, a re  as d ead  as th e  dodo?
But at this po in t, e n te r  again  P ro fessor McYVhinney: W in shou ld  not 
the ( io v ern o r-G en era l exercise th e  pow er of reservation  “in his ow n. p ro p e r 
constitu tional ju d g m en t' ? ’* W in shou ld  he not resum e the  p e rfo rm an ce  
of his statutory du tv  (ab an d o n ed , I u n d e rs ta n d , these m a in  vears) to send 
“an au th en tic  ( lop \ ” of 'evera Act he lias assen ted  to  “to o ne  ol H er Majest * "s 
Principal Secretaries ol S tate" in the  I  n ited  K ingdom , which w ould set in 
m otion the whole process of disallow ance?
Why not? Because it w ould d rive  a co ach -an d -fo u r th ro u g h  C anada 's  
sovereignty. The pow er of the B ritish Parliam ent to legislate fo r C anada 
is gone. B ut the pow er of the  B ritish C abinet to negate  C an ad ian  legislation 
w ould rem ain .
THE PATRIATION REFERENCE
W hat p a rt have the  cou rts  played in tfie developm en t of th e  conven­
tions? Till 1981, none. I hev have from  tim e to tim e no ted  it. com m en ted  
on it. T h ey  have not been part of it. But on S ep tem b er 28, 1981. six of 
the n ine judges of the S u p rem e  C o u rt o f  C anada  h an d ed  dow n a decision 
that conven tion , th o u g h  not law. req u ired  that certa in  am en d m en ts  to the 
C anad ian  C onstitu tion  m ust have a “substantial m easu re” o r a “substantial 
d eg ree" of provincial consent.
l lie specific question  is now. of course , ol merely liisio iu .il in terest. 
I In Constitution \( t. 1982, in.ikes am en d m en ts  of out ( onstitu tio ii ,i m allei 
ol s t iu t  law. it l.ns dow n foui p recise form ul.is lot d illc re n t types ol 
am endm ents that set down the degree  of pi ovinei.tl consent required. I lieie 
is no need  to resort to conventions.
But th e re  a re  plenty  of conven tions, o r alleged conventions, on which 
som eone, in sp ired  bv the decision of S ep tem ber 2N, 1981. m ight seek a
'"O/j (ii . p I HO
v,< 125 I) I K (M i I OH
CONVENTIONS OE THE CONSTITUTION 27
jud icial decision. W hat, if  any, is th e  function  o f  the  co u rts  in relation  to 
these? H ave th e  co u rts  th e  rig h t to  decide w hat they are? I f  so, w hat force 
has the  decision? Is it desirab le , o r  even safe, to  have th e  cou rts  m aking 
such decisions at all? ^
T h ese  questions h ad  no t been  seriously considered  by anyone in C an ­
ada till a very few years ago. In  1980, th e  G ov ern m en t o f  C an ad a  p roposed  
a series o f  am e n d m e n ts  to  the  w ritten  C onstitu tion , to  be p ro cu red  by 
sim ple A ddress o f  th e  Senate  an d  the  H ouse o f  C om m ons to  the  Q ueen  
asking fo r the  necessary  B ritish legislation. O nly two provinces, O n ta rio  
and  New B runsw ick, su p p o rte d  th e  p ro p o sed  A ddress. T h e  o th e r  eight 
opposed  it, particu la rly  th e  m ethod  o f  p roceed ing , w ithout the  consent o f 
the provinces. N ew fo u n d lan d , M anitoba an d  Q uebec re fe r re d  the  m atte r 
to  th e ir  C o u rts  o f  A ppeal.
T h e  N ew fo u n d lan d  an d  M anitoba re fe rences asked th ree  identical 
questions:
1. Would the proposed amendments affect “federal-provincial relation­
ships or the powers, rights or privileges granted or secured bv the Con­
stitution of Canada to the provinces, their legislatures or governments, . . . 
and if so, in what respect or respects?”
2. “Is it a constitutional convention that the House of Common.' and the 
Senate will not request . . . the Queen to lav before the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom . . .  a measure to amend the Constitution of Canada 
affecting federal-provincial relationships or the powers, lights or priv­
ileges granted or secured to the provinces, theii legislatures or govern­
ments without first obtaining the agreement of the provinces?"
3. "Is the agreement of the provinces of Canada constitutionallv required" 
for amendments of the kinds stated?"'
T h e  answ er to  th e  first question  is a m a tte r o f  strict law. It does not 
concern  us here . T h e  answ er to  the  th ird  d ep en d s  partly  on  the  answ er to 
the  second. T h e re  is certa in ly  no  such req u irem en t in any s ta tu te .“  But 
that does no t en d  th e  m atte r. If th e re  is a convention  that provincial consent 
is req u ired , has th a t conven tion  acqu ired  th e  force o f law? Both the second 
and  th ird  questions th e re fo re  a re  relevant to  o u r  inquiry. T h e  N ew found­
land re fe ren ce  had  a fo u rth  question , purely  legal, in re la tion  to the term s 
o f  u n ion  on which N ew fo u n d lan d  e n te re d  C o n fed era tio n . This does not 
concern  us here .
The Q uebec re fe re n ce  asked two questions:
A. W ould the proposed amendments "affect <i) the legislative competence 
of the provincial legislatures. . .?" (ii) "the status or role of the provincial 
legislatures oi governments within the Canadian Constitution?"
B "Does the Canadian Constitution empower, whether In statute, conven­
tion or otherwise, the Senate and the House of Commons to cause 
the Canadian Constitution to Ik* amended without the consent of the 
provinces and in spite of the objection of several of them, in sui h mannei 
as to affect" (i) or (ii) above?42
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Q uestion  A is essentially the  sam e as q uestion  1 in th e  N ew found land  
an d  M anitoba re fe ren ces, a n d  so does no t concern  us here . Q uestion  B 
covers the  sam e g ro u n d  as questions 2 a n d  3 in those  references.
In  th e  N ew fo u n d lan d  C o u rt o f  A ppeal, all th re e  judges said “Yes” to  
questions 2 an d  3. In  th e  M anitoba C o u rt o f  A ppeai, F reed m an , C .J.M . 
an d  M atas, J.A. said “N o” to  questions 2 an d  3. Hall, J .A . re fu sed  to  answ er 
question  2 “because it is no t a p p ro p ria te  fo r  jud ic ia l re sp o n se”, an d  said 
“N o” to  question  3. O ’Sullivan, J .A . said “Yes” to  bo th  2 an d  3. H u b an d , 
J.A . said “N o” to  2 an d  “Yes” to  3. In  th e  Q uebec  C o u rt o f  A ppeal, fo u r 
o f  th e  five ju d g e s  answ ered  “Yes” to  both  p a rts  o f  question  B; th a t is, tha t 
th e re  is no conven tion  o f  provincial consen t, an d  no  legal req u irem en t fo r 
such co n sen t.4*
T h e  ju d g m en ts  o f  all th re e  C o u rts  o f  A ppeal w ere ap p ea led  to  the  
S uprem e C o u rt o f  C anada.
T h e  C hief Justice, an d  Dickson, Beetz, Estey, M cIntyre , C h o u in a rd  
and  L am er, JJ.A. ru led  th a t th e  provinces had  the  righ t to  pu t to  th e  cou rts  
questions tha t w ere not m atte rs  o f  strict law, an d  tha t th e  co u rts  had  “a 
d iscretion  to  ref use to  answ er such q u estio n s’’.44 T h e  seven judges fo u n d  
no  sta tu to ry  req u irem en t fo r provincial consen t, an d  re jec ted  th e  c o n te n ­
tion that conven tion  could  h a rd en  o r crystallize in to  law.45
M artland  a n d  R itchie, J J. d issen ted . I hey had  jo in e d  with Dickson. 
Beetz, C h o u in a rd  an d  L am er, JJ. in ho ld ing  tha t th e re  was a constitu tional 
convention  re q u irin g  “substan tia l a g re e m e n t” of th e  provinces fo r a m e n d ­
m ents affecting  the  pow ers, righ ts o r privileges of th e  provinces (a decision 
which is the m ain  subject of this inquiry). It follow ed, in the op in ion  of 
M artland  an d  Ritchie, J J., that this ag reem en t was “constitu tionally  re ­
q u ire d ”.4,1 T h e  rest o f  th e ir  d issen t deals with th e  question  o f  w h e th e r the 
pow er to p ro ceed  w ithout provincial consen t has been  c o n fe rre d  on  the 
two H ouses "o therw ise  th an  by s ta tu te  o r  co n v en tio n ”.47 T h is  does not 
concern  us here .
We com e now to the  decision of D ickson. Beetz. C h o u in a rd , Lam er. 
M artland  and  Ritchie. JJ. (the Chief Ju stice  and  F.ste\ an d  M cIn tyre. JJ ., 
d issen ting  on th e  question  of a convention  req u irin g  provincial consent to 
am en d m en ts  affec ting  the  pow ers, righ ts o r  p rv ile g e s  of the provinces).
The reasons fo r judgm ent confine them selves wholly to this part of 
question  2 in th e  N ew found land  and  M anitoba re fe ren ces and  the second
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p a rt o f  question  A in th e  Q uebec  re fe ren ce . T h ey  leave o u t any consid­
era tio n  o f  th e  q uestion  ra ised  in th e  o th e r  p a rts  o f  those  questions.4”
T h is  is an  e x tra o rd in a ry  a n d  wholly u n w a rra n te d  exclusion, especially 
in view o f  th e  C o u r t’s ow n ju d g m e n t in th e  S enate  R eference  Case.49 T h e  
d issen ting  o p in ion  righ tly  insists th a t am en d m en ts  “affec ting  fed e ra l-p ro v ­
incial re la tio n sh ip s” o r  “th e  sta tus o r  ro le  o f  the  provincial legislatures o r 
g o v ern m en ts” m ust also be co n s id e red .50 T o  d o  o therw ise  is to ig n o re  the 
plain m ean in g  o f  th e  w ord “o r” in th e  N ew fo u n d lan d  an d  M anitoba re f­
erences, an d  questions A (ii) an d  B (ii) in th e  Q uebec  re fe ren ce , an d  hence 
to  fail to  answ er o n e  o f  th e  two questions asked.
T h e  reasons fo r ju d g m e n t, while ad m ittin g  th a t "C ounsel fo r several 
provinces strenuously  a rg u e d  th a t the  conven tion  exists an d  req u ires  the 
ag reem en t o f  all th e  p rov inces”, reject this la tte r co n ten tio n , rely ing es­
pecially on  the  Quebec R efe ren ce ’s “an d  in spite o f  th e  objection o f  several 
o f  th e m ”. ' 1
In my view, this is a fo rced  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  th e  question  in the  M an­
itoba an d  N ew fo u n d lan d  R eferences, an d  it is no t he lped  bv th e  ex tra  
p h rase  in th e  Q uebec  R eference. I f  the  “consen t o f  th e  prov inces” m eans 
consen t o f  all the  provinces, th en  th e  p h rase  is su rp lu s  verbiage. I f  “consent 
o f  the  p rov inces” m eans less than all, th en  it presum ably’ m eans th a t the  
consent o f  som e u n d e fin ed  n u m b er, less th an  ten , w ould suffice, p rov ided  
som e u n d efin ed  n u m b e r d id  not explicitly object. W hat num bers?  T h e re  
is no ind ication .
For th e  reasons set ou t in the  d issen ting  o p in ion  “ag reem en t of the 
p rov inces” o r  “consen t o f  th e  p rov inces” m ust m ean  ag reem en t o r  consent 
o f  all th e  provinces, particu la rly  because, as that op in ion  po in ts ou t, “the 
question  assum es th a t all p rovinces a re  equal reg a rd in g  th e ir  respective 
constitu tional positions”.52 M oreover, n<ery one of the precedents c ited in the  
reasons fo r ju d g m en t in su p p o rt o f  a conven tion  of provincial ag reem en t 
o r  consen t shows th e  ag reem en t o r  consen t of all the  p rovinces as will be 
seen.
U n d e r  th e  head , “R eq u irem en ts  fo r estab lish ing  a conven tion  ”, the 
reasons fo r  ju d g m en t (quo ting  Sir Ivor Jen n in g s) say tha t “the  first question  
we have to  ask ourselves is “w hat a re  the  p reced en ts?"5' They th en  e n u ­
m era te  tw enty-tw o am e n d m e n ts  to  th e  C an ad ian  C onstitu tion . O f  these, 
the  last, “A m en d m en ts  by O rd e r  in C ouncil” (the adm ission to C o n fed ­
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e ra tio n  of R u p e rt’s L and , th e  N orth -W este rn  T e rrito ry , an d  British C o­
lum bia, an d  Prince E dw ard  Island  by U n ited  K ingdom  O rd e r  in C ouncil, 
u n d e r  the  provisions o f  section 146 o f  th e  B ritish N o rth  A m erica Act, 1867) 
a re  not really am en d m en ts  at all. T h ey  a re  m erely  the  im p lem en ta tion  o f 
the  provisions o f  section 146 o f  th e  act o f  1867 in accordance  with the  
precise p ro ced u res  it p rescribed . O f  th e  o th e r  tw enty-one, th ir teen  affected  
n e ith e r federa l-p rov incia l re la tionsh ips n o r th e  pow ers, rig h t an d  privileges 
o f  th e  provinces. O nly  th e  rem ain in g  n ine  call fo r exam ination .
(i) The British North America Act, 1871. T h is  may be said to  have af fected  
federa l-p rov incia l re la tionsh ips by em p o w erin g  P arliam ent to  c rea te  new 
provinces o u t o f  te rrito rie s  no t inc luded  in any province; an d  to have 
affec ted  both  federa l-p rov incia l re la tionsh ips an d  th e  pow ers o f  the p ro v ­
inces by em p o w erin g  Parliam ent to  change  th e  limits of a m  province with 
the  consen t o f  tha t p rov ince’s legislature.
T o  this a m e n d m e n t, provincial a g reem en t o r  consent was n e ith e r asked 
for n o r  given.
(ii) The British North America Act, 1886. T h is, as the  d issen ting  op in ion  
savs, "substantially  a ffec ted  th e  Provinces . . . fit] gave pow er to P arliam ent 
to p rov ide  fo r p arliam en ta ry  rep resen ta tio n  in the  Senate an d  the  H ouse 
o f  C om m ons fo r te rrito rie s  no t f o rm in g  part of any province, an d  th e re fo re  
a lte red  th e  provincial balance o f  re p re se n ta tio n ”. ’4
T o  this am en d m en t also, provincial ag reem en t o r consent was n e ith e r 
asked fo r n o r  given.
(iii) The British North America Act, 1907. T h is , to q u o te  again  the d is­
sen ting  op in io n , “ch an g ed  th e  basis o f  federa l subsidies payable to the  
Provinces an d  th u s d irectly  a ffec ted  th e  provincial in te rests”. F o r  the first 
tim e, th e  provinces w ere consu lted . All except British C olum bia, consen ted . 
British C olum bia actively o p p o sed  the  am en d m en t. It w anted  m ore  m oney, 
an d  it objected  to the  s ta tem en t in the  p ro p o sed  Act that *’ e settlem ent ol 
the  subsidy question  in th e  Act was to lx* “final an d  u n a lte rab le”. It d id  not 
get m ore  m oney, but it got “final and  u n a lte rab le” struck  ou t. T h e  G ov­
e rn m e n t of C an ad a  an d  the  G overn m en ts  of the  o th e r  provinces accepted  
this, an d , in the  w ords o f  the  reasons fo r ju d g m en t, " th e  P rem ier of British 
C olum bia d id  not ref use to ag ree  to th e  Act l>eing passed”. In sh o rt, th e re  
was, eventually , u n an im o u s (if. on the  p a rt of the  G overnm en t of C anada 
an d  th e  G o v ern m en ts  of th e  o th e r  provinces, som ew hat re luc tan t, o r  g ru d g ­
ing) consent.
(iv) The British North America Act, 1915. T h is Act c rea ted  a new S ena­
torial Division, the  fo u r W estern  provinces, with tw en tv -four Senators, the
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sam e n u m b e r as O n ta rio , Q uebec  a n d  th e  M aritim e Provinces. T h is, in the 
w ords o f  th e  d issen ting  op in io n , “h ad  a po ten tia l fo r a lte rin g  the  provincial 
balance”. '7 In  fact, it d id  a lte r th e  provincial balance.
T o  this am endm ent, provincial consent was neither ask#*d for no r given.
(v) The British North America Act, 1930. T h is  gave th e  P rairie  provinces 
th e ir  n a tu ra l resources, a n d  British C olum bia its Peace River Belt (which 
had  been  w ithheld  w hen it e n te re d  C o n fed era tio n ). T h e  Act con firm ed  
ag reem en ts  betw een th e  G o v ern m en t o f  C anada  an d  th e  G overn m en ts  o f  
the  fo u r  provinces. I'he o th e r  provinces had  a lready  given g enera l approval 
at th e  D om inion-provincial C o n fe ren ce  o f  1927. T h e ir  in terests  w ere a f­
fected by th e  alienation  o f  assets fo rm erly  u n d e r  the  co n tro l o f  the  Do­
m in io n ,'8 bu t th e ir  fo rm al ag reem en t o r consen t was not even asked for, 
let alone ob ta ined .
In this case, form ally , th e re  was the  ag reem en t o r consen t o f  only the 
fo u r provinces d irectly  co n cern ed . T h e  ag reem en t o f  the  o th e r  five (as they 
th en  were) was in fo rm al o r  tacit: they d id  no t object. It can be a rg u ed  that 
this case shows e ith e r  (a) th a t th e re  m ust be u n an im o u s ag reem en t o r  
consen t, at least tacit, o r  (b) tha t any a m e n d m en t affec ting  only a p a rticu la r 
p rovince, o r  p a rticu la r provinces, m ust have the  ag reem en t o r consen t o f  
that p rov ince o r  those provinces. T h e  case does n o th in g  to  establish any 
g enera l p rinc ip le  tha t every  am en d m en t ‘‘a ffec ting  federal-p rov incial re ­
lationships o r  th e  pow ers, righ ts o r privileges g ra n te d  o r  secu red  by the 
C onstitu tion  o f  C an ad a  to th e  prov inces, th e ir  legislatures o r  governm en ts"  
m ust have th e  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  som e u n d e te rm in e d  n u m b e r of 
provinces, m o re  th an  two but less th an  ten.
(vi) The Statute of Westminister, 1931. I bis, th o u g h  not in fo rm  an 
am en d m en t to the B ritish N o rth  A m erica Acts, 1867-1930, d id  in fact 
am en d  them  by giving both  Parliam ent an d  the provincial leg isla tures ex tra  
pow ers. It d id  not, how ever, change the  pre-ex isting  division of legislative 
pow er betw een Parliam ent an d  the  provincial legislatures.
T o  this Act, th e re  was u n an im o u s provincial ag reem en t o r  consen t.
T h e  sam e holds fo r (vii) The British North America Act, 1940  (u n e m ­
p loym ent in su rance), (viii) The British North America Act, 1951 (old age p e n ­
sions), an d  (ix) The British North America Act, 1964 (disability an d  surv ivors’ 
pensions).
1'he last five of these  am en d m en ts  prov ide w hat the  reasons fo r ju d g ­
m ent call the  ‘‘positive p reced en ts”.'*' It could  be a rg u ed  th a t thev prov ide 
a basis fo r conc lu d in g  th a t, fo r the  kinds of am en d m en ts  specified in the 
M anitoba an d  N ew fo u n d lan d  R eferences, and , in effect, in the  Quebec
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R eference, the  u n an im o u s  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  th e  provinces is re ­
q u ired . T h ey  p rov ide  no  basis w hatever fo r a conven tion  th a t the  ag reem en t 
o r  consen t o f  m ore  th an  tw o bu t less th an  ten  provinces is req u ired .
T h e  reasons fo r ju d g m e n t, how ever, say*’ th a t we m ust look also at 
th e  “negative” p reced en ts: th e  cases w here  a p ro p o sed  am en d m en t failed 
o f  ad o p tion . O f  these, they  cite four.
(i) T h e  p ro p o sed  am e n d m e n t o f  1951, to  give th e  provinces a lim ited 
pow er o f  ind irect taxation . O n ta rio  an d  Q uebec d id  not ag ree , an d  the 
p ro p o sed  am e n d m e n t was d ro p p e d . T h is  w ould no t a p p e a r  to  show that 
th e  ag reem en t o r  co nsen t o f  e igh t provinces was no t en o u g h  to m eet the 
req u irem en ts  o f  the  alleged  conven tion ; o r  p e rh ap s  tha t the  ag reem en t o f 
eigh t p rovinces which d id  not include O n ta rio , o r  Q uebec , o r  p e rh ap s  both 
O n ta rio  an d  Q uebec, was no t en o u g h .
(ii) I'he p ro p o sed  am en d in g  fo rm u la  o f  I960. “T h e  g reat m ajority  o f 
th e  partic ipan ts" (the  D om inion an d  the  provinces, in the  C onstitu tional 
C o n feren ce  o f  tha t year), say the  reasons fo r ju d g m e n t,ftl “fo u n d  th e  fo r­
m ula acceptable but som e d iffe ren ces rem ain ed  an d  the  p ro p o sed  a m e n d ­
m ent was no t p ro ceed ed  w ith”. T h is  w ould a p p e a r  to  show th a t even the 
ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  “th e  g reat m ajority” o f  the  provinces was not 
en o u g h  to  m eet the  req u irem en ts  o f  th e  alleged conven tion ,
(iii) T h e  p ro p o sed  am en d in g  fo rm ula  o f  1964. H ere  th e re  was, initially, 
un an im o u s ag reem en t, bu t Q uebec  “subsequen tly  w ithdrew  its ag reem en t 
an d  the  p roposed  am en d m en t was not p ro ceed ed  with".*2 T h is  w ould a p ­
p ea r to show that even th e  ag reem en t o r  consent o f n ine  provinces was 
not en o u g h  to  m eet th e  req u irem en ts  o f  th e  alleged conven tion ; o r at least 
that the am en d m en t o r consen t o f  n in e  provinces which d id  not include 
Q uebec, was not en o u g h .
(iv) T h e  p ro p o sed  V ictoria C h a rte r  o f  1971. H ere  eight provinces 
ag reed ; Q uebec, say th e  reasons fo r ju d g m en t,"1 “d isag reed  an d  Saskatch­
ew an which had  a new g o v ern m en t d id  not take a position because it was 
believed the  d isag reem en t of Q uebec  re n d e re d  the  question  academ ic. 1 he 
p ro p o sed  a m en d m en ts  w ere not p ro ceed ed  w ith”. I bis ap p ea rs  to show 
that the  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  eigh t p rovinces was not en o u g h ; o r  at 
least that the  ag reem en t o r  consen t of eight p rovinces w ithout Q uebec was 
not en o u g h ; o r  p e rh ap s  that the  ag reem en t o r  consen t of eigh t provinces 
w ithout Quel>cc an d  Saskatchew an was not en o u g h . So th e  “negative" prec ­
e d en ts  seem  to ind ica te  th a t th e  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  n ine provinces, 
o r  o f  e igh t provinces, o r  o f  “the  g rea t m ajority” o f  the  provinces, is not 
en o u g h ; o r at least th a t Quel>ec m ust be one  of the  eight o r  n ine consen ting  
provinces.
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From  all th e  p reced en ts , positive an d  negative, it w ould th e re fo re  seem  
to follow th a t th e  ag re e m e n t o r  consen t o f  e ig h t provinces, o r  n in e  p ro v ­
inces, o r  o f  “th e  g rea t m ajority  o f  th e  p rov inces” is no t en o u g h  to  m eet the  
req u irem en ts  o f  th e  alleged  convention .
T h e  reasons fo r ju d g m e n t64 actually ad m it th a t “th e  p reced en ts  taken  
alone p o in t at u n an im ity ” as be ing  conventionally  req u ire d  fo r the  kinds 
o f  am en d m en ts  co n tem p la ted  in the  th re e  R eferences. T h e  “positive” and  
the  “negative” p reced en ts  they cite m ight, in d eed , be taken  to  p rov ide  the  
basis fo r a constitu tional conven tion  req u ir in g  th e  u n an im o u s consen t o f  
the provinces; th o u g h  in my op in ion  they  a re  too  few, an d  sp read  over too 
sho rt a perio d  to  d o  so. (In  th e  reasons fo r decision on  th e  pure ly  legal 
question , the  C o u rt itself says th a t a conven tion  d e p e n d s  “on  a consistent 
course  o f  political recogn ition  . . . developed  over a considerable period of 
time”.65
T h e  m ajority  decision relies heavily on the  White Paper o f  1965. T h a t 
p ap e r, it notes, was “c ircu la ted  to all th e  provinces p r io r  to  its publication  
and  . . . fo u n d  satisfactory by all o f  them ", an d  sets fo rth  “accep ted  con ­
stitu tional ru les an d  p rinc ip les” on  the  am en d m en t o f  the  C onstitu tion . 
T h e  “fo u rth  g enera l p rin c ip le” was “th a t the  C an ad ian  P arliam en t will not 
request an a m e n d m en t d irectly  a ffec ting  federa l-p rov incia l re la tionsh ips 
w ithout p rio r  consu lta tion  an d  ag reem en t with the p rov inces”. It adds: 
“T his p rinc ip le  d id  not em erg e  as earlv  as o th e rs  bu t since 1907, and  
particu larly  since 1930, has gained  increasing  recogn ition  an d  accep tance”. 
In th e  M anitoba C o u rt o f  A ppeal, F reed m an , C .J.M ., had  d raw n  a tten tion  
to the  fact tha t “it is only increasing recogn ition  an d  accep tance  th a t have 
been ach ieved”. T h e  m ajority  in th e  S u p rem e  C o u rt re jec ted  this. It also 
ignored  the  White Papers ow n s ta tem en t th a t the  “princip les" a re  “not 
constitu tionally  b in d in g  in any strict sense”, an il th a t “th e  n a tu re  a n d  d eg ree  
o f provincial p a rtic ipa tion  in the  am en d in g  process . . . have not lent th em ­
selves to  easy d e fin itio n ”.66
But n e ith e r th e  “positive” n o r  th e  “negative” p reced en ts  p rov ide  any 
basis at all fo r a conven tion  that the  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  less th an  ten 
but m ore  th an  two provinces is req u ired  to  give constitu tional validity to 
am en d m en ts  o f  th e  two kinds at issue. In d eed , the  negative p receden ts 
strongly  suggest th a t the  ag reem en t o r  consent o f  Q uebec  is ind ispensable; 
hence, that th e  ag reem en t o r consen t o f  seven provinces, p rov ided  the  
seven include Q uebec , m ight be sufficient, but tha t th e  ag reem en t o r co n ­
sent o f  even n ine , w ithou t Q uebec , w ould not. H ow ever, th e  Q uebec R ef­
e rence  has now squashed  this possibility.67
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Seven o f  th e  n in e  ju d g e s  answ ering  th e  question  w h e th e r th e  ag re e ­
m en t o r  consen t o f  th e  p rovinces is legally necessary fo r am en d m en ts  o f  
th e  tw o kinds co n tem p la ted  by th e  th re e  R eferences reject P ro fessor Led- 
e rm a n ’s th eo ry  th a t “substan tia l provincial com pliance  o r  consen t . . .  is 
su ffic ien t”. T h ey  say (in th e  reasons fo r ju d g m e n t on  th a t question): “Al­
th o u g h  P ro fesso r L ed erm an  w ould no t give a veto to  Prince E dw ard  Island, 
he  w ould  to  O n ta rio  o r  Q uebec  o r  B ritish C olum bia o r  A lberta. T h is  is an 
im possible position  fo r a C o u rt to  m an ag e .”8" Yet six o f  th e  seven ju d g es , 
d ea ling  with th e  co n ten tio n  th a t th e  ag re e m e n t o r  consen t o f  th e  provinces 
is conventionally necessary, in effect adopt Professor L ederm an’s view, which, 
significantly, rested  on  th e  basis th a t there already existed a conven tion  that 
req u ired  at least “sub stan tia l” ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  the  provinces, and 
that this convention had hardened or crystallized into law. But what the  seven 
judges called “ar. im possible position  fo r a C o u rt to m an ag e” in respect o f  
a leg;*! req u irem en t m ysteriously becom es, fo r six o f  th e  seven, perfectly  
acceptable in respect o f  a conven tion  on  w hich th e  alleged legal re q u ire m e n t 
was based.
T h e  w hole a rg u m e n t o f  th e  reasons fo r ju d g m en ts  leads, in d eed , to
a gulf profound as that Serbonian bog.
Betwixt Darniata and Mount Cassius old.
Where armies whole have sunk.
T h e  one  conclusion tha t em erg es unm istakably  from  exam ina tion  of 
the  p reced en ts  is th a t, fo r a constitu tional conven tion  re q u ir in g  the  ag re e ­
m ent o r  consen t o f  m o re  th an  tw o but less th an  ten  provinces to  a m e n d ­
m ents o f  the  k ind c o n tem p la ted , th e re  is no p reced en t w hatsoever. A 
constitu tional conven tion  w ithout a single p reced en t to su p p o rt it is a house 
w ithout anv fo u n d a tio n . Sir Ivor Jennings, in th e  passage a lready  q u o ted , 
says “th e  first question  we have to  ask ourselves is, what a re  th e  p reced en ts?” 
T ru e , he ad d s that “a single p reced en t w ith a good  reason  may be en o u g h  
to  establish th e  ru le ”. But, ind ispu tab ly , at least one  p reced en t is essential. 
I f  th e re  is no  p reced en t, th e re  is no  conven tion .
T h e  six judges n onetheless a ffirm ed  th a t, th o u g h  th e re  was no  co n ­
vention req u irin g  u n an im o u s consen t o f  th e  provinces (fo r which they could 
have p ro d u ced , an d  indeed  a id  p ro d u ce , substan tia l p reced en t), th e re  was 
a conven tion  req u ir in g  so m eth in g  less th an  u n an im o u s con sen t (for which 
they could  p ro d u ce  no  p re c e d e n t at all). U nd ism ayed , they p ro ceed ed  to 
set it ou t.
T h ey  said, co rrectly , tha t the  C o u rt was not being  asked to en fo rce  a 
conven tion . W e a re  asked to recognize if it ex ists”. T h ey  answ ered  that it 
did.**
•‘"il'WL'l. 12f> I) t. K <3d>. ‘J't 
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I f  it ex isted , th e  ju d g e s  shou ld  have been  able to tell us w hat it was. 
B ut all we get is th a t th e  allegedly ind ispensab le  ag reem en t o r  consen t o f  
the  provinces m ust be o f  “substantial d e g re e ”; a “substantial m easu re”. T h is  
n eed  no t be th e  ag re e m e n t o f  ten , b u t m ust be th e  ag reem en t o r  consen t 
o f  m ore  th an  two. T h e  ag reem en t o f  O n ta rio  an d  New B runsw ick alone 
“does no t disclose a sufficient m easu re  o f  provincial a g re e m e n t”.70
So it’s less th an  ten , bu t m ore  th an  two. T h e n  how m any? N o answ er. 
W hat a re  the  excuses o ffe red  fo r this aston ish ing  silence?
First:
In 1965, the White P aper' had stated that 'the nature and degree of prov­
incial participation in the amending process have not lent themselves to 
easy definition’. Nothing has <xxurred since then which would permit us to 
conclude in a more precise manner. Nor can it be said that this lack of 
precision is such as to prevent the principle from acquiring the constitutional 
statm of a conventional rule. If a consensus had emerged on the measure 
of provincial agreement, an amending formula could quickly have been 
enacted and we would not longer be in the realm of conventions.7*
O n this, th re e  com m en ts a re  necessarv. hirst, the  While Paper said “nature 
and  d e g re e ”. In o th e r  w ords, what was in question  involved not only the  
number o f  provinces req u ired  but also specification o f  which provinces. Sec­
ondly , if a consensus had  em erg ed  we should  have got an  am en d in g  fo r­
mula written into the fundam ental law. But th.tt would have involved getting 
an am en d m en t, an  am en d m en t which w ould most certain ly  have affec ted  
federal-provincial relationships, and  the “|H>wers, t ights o r privileges g ran ted  
o r secured  to the  provinces, th e ir  legislatures o r  g o v ern m en ts”, G etting  
that am en d m en t w ould, on th e ir  L ordsh ips ' a rg u m en t, have involved g e t­
ting  the  ag reem en t of a “substan tia l" n u m b e r of provinces, less th an  ten 
but m ore  th an  two. W e “ev erm o re  com e out In that sam e d o o r w herein  
we w ent”. T h ird ly , in I‘Mi l. we d id  get the  ag reem en t o r  consent of nine 
provinces. But Q uebec balked, and  th e  p ro p o sed  am en d m en t d ied . I he 
“d eg ree"  ol consen t, less th an  ten  but more* than  two. was certainly “sub­
s ta n t ia l .  But tlie “n a tu re"  ol that < o n se n t. a consent w hie h lelt out Q u eb ec . 
a p p a re n ih  was clefec i i \ r .
T h e  second excuse fo r not saying even how m any (let alone which) 
p rovinces’ consen t was req u ired  bv th e  alleged convention  is:
It would not Ik1 appropriate for the Court to devise in ihe abstrae t a specific 
formula which would indicate in positive terms what measure of provincial 
consent is required foi the convention to be complied with. Conventions bv 
their nature* develop in a political field and it will Ik- for the- political actors, 
not this Court, to determine the degree of provincial consent required.7'
~“ihut. 103
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O n this also, th re e  com m ents a re  necessary.
First, no  o n e  asked  th e  C o u rt to  “devise” any fo rm ula . It was asked, 
in its own w ords, “to  recognize if [a conven tion] ex ist[ed]”. It answ ered , in 
effect, “Yes; it’s th e re ; we recognize it; we see it". B ut if it recognized  
som eth ing  which it assures us a lready  ex isted , it shou ld  have been  able to 
tell us w hat it was. I f  we a re  constitu tionally  b o u n d  by a ru le , we have a 
righ t to  know w hat th e  ru le  is. O therw ise, how can we know w h ether, o r 
w hen, o r  how, it is being  transgressed?
Must the “substantial” consent include Q uebec? O ntario? Both o f  them ? 
Must it inc lude  o n e , o r m ore , o f  the  A tlantic provinces? O f  th e  W estern  
provinces? W ould th e  consen t o f  the  fo u r A tlantic provinces plus M anitoba 
an d  Saskatchew an be en o u g h ?  The p e rm u ta tio n s  an d  com binations are  
n u m ero u s  and  fascinating.
P rofessor S oberm an  has p o in ted  ou t th a t if th e  consent o f  n ine p ro v ­
inces is "su ffic ien t” bu t eigh t is no t,
then Ontario with over 35% of the population, or Quebec with over 25% 
cannot veto, but Prince F.dward Island and Newfoundland together, with 
less than 3% of the population can veto. If eight is enough but seven is not, 
the straight nose counting leads to an even more unacceptable result: On­
tario and Quebec, with over 609? of the population of Canada cannot block 
an amendment, but the two Atlantic provinces noted above, joined In New 
Brunswick, and together containing less than of the population can 
exercise a veto!74
All th e  clue we get to solving th e  puzzle is: m ore  th an  two, but less 
th an  te r , m ust consen t.
T h e  Prim e M inister o f  C an ad a , c o n fro n te d  by th e  C o u r t’s decision, 
could no t know w h e th e r he was conventionally  b o u n d , on  th e  C o u rt's  show ­
ing, *.o get the consen t o f  six provinces, o r  seven, o r  e igh t, o r  nine; o r  which 
o f  them  it m ust include. But let him  stray o n e  inch fro m  the  path  o f  the  
conven tion  the  six judges p ro fessed  to have m ark ed  o u t fo r him  an d  his 
action w ould be b ra n d e d  “u n constitu tiona l" , even “im m oral", “m orally 
w rong".75
T h e  second com m en t relates to th e  sta tem en t “ It will be fo r th e  political 
ac tors . . .  to d e te rm in e  th e  d eg re e  of provincial consent req u ired "  (italics 
m ine). N ote the tense: fu tu re . In  o th e r  w ords, th e  conven tion  the  judges 
p ro fessed  to “recogn ize” existed  only in em bryo . A constitu tional rule, a 
binding constitu tional ru le , of th a t kind is so m eth ing  new. it certain ly  does 
not m eet Jennings test of g enera l acceptance.
I he th ird  com m ent is tha t “devise in th e  ab strac t” is exactly what the 
C ourt d id . It p lucked  out of th e  air a “conven tion" w ithout a sing le-p rec­
eden t to su p p o rt it.
’ / hr < nurt urui ihr ( ̂ institution Snmr I ommmts <hi I hi Suprrmr Court R rfrrrntt on ( omhlutiiituil Amrndmmt. 
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T h e  d issen tin g  op in io n  o f  th e  C h ie f Justice and  Estey and  M cIntyre, 
JJ ., hits th e  nail square ly  on  th e  head:
For the Court to postulate some . . . convention requiring less than unani­
mous provincial consent to constitutional amendments would amount, in 
effect, to an attempt by judicial pronouncement to create an amending 
formula for the Canadian Constitution which . . . would be incomplete for 
failure to specify the degree or percentage of provincial consent . . .  A con­
vention must be recognized, known and understood with sufficient clarity 
that conformance is possible and a breach of conformance immediately 
discernible.76
Closely exam in ed , th en , th e  decision o f  the  six judges is no t a very 
im pressive p e rfo rm a n c e ,77 desp ite  the  ra p tu re  with which it was g ree ted  
by (surprise!) th e  e ig h t provincial G overnm en ts an d  m uch o f  the  press.
But o ugh t they  to have m ade any decision at all? In the  M anitoba 
C ourt o f  A ppeal, H all, J.A., as we have seen, said flatly th a t th e  question  
was “not a p p ro p ria te  fo r  ju d ic ia l re sp o n se” ; and  in the  S u p rem e C ourt o f 
C anada the th re e  d issen ting  judges w ere clearly u n h ap p y  answ ering  it. 
T hey  po in ted  o u t th a t it ra ised
no legal question . . . and ordinarily, the Court would not undertake to 
answer . . . for it is not the function of the Court to go beyond legal determinations. 
Because of the unusual nature of these References and because the issues 
raised . . . were argued at some length belore the Court and have become the 
subject of the reasom of the majority, with which, with the utmost deference, 
we cannot agree, we f eel obliged to answer the questions notwithstanding then 
extra-legal nature.7H (Italics mine.)
I th ink  they had  good reasons fo r th e ir  qualm s.
K now ledge o f  co nstitu tiona l conventions is not easilv com e bv. T h e  
subject is com plex . As a lread y  no ted , it involves exam in ing  the  p reced en ts  
and  a variety o f  d o cu m en ts , th e  p ro n o u n cem en ts  of em inen t statesm en 
and  im p o rtan t politicians, a n d  the  w ritings o f  constitu tional au tho rities. It 
involves also d ec id in g  w hich o f  these w ere soundly  based a n d  w hether 
changes in the  political s itua tion  o r c u ltu re  have m ade them  irrelevan t.
Not every ju d g e , even o f  th e  su p e rio r  courts, will have been able to 
do  this (som e, o f  course , will be veterans o f  active politics, w ith direct 
experience  o f  th e  p revailing  usages, practices and  custom s; but som e will 
no t).7“ N ot every  counsel, how ever lea rn ed  in the law, will be eq u ip p ed  to 
help  the  judges. A nd th e re  a re  som etim es plausible constitu tional quacks, 
o r au th o rs  rich in lea rn in g  but poo r in judgm en t, to  m uddy  the  waters.
7h( 1982), 125 1)1. R. (3d). I 14. 125
"For exhaustive professional critiques, see The Court unit thr ( Constitution: McWhinnev. 80-9; Petet Hogg, 
in 60 (Carutdum Hut Rrviru . 307-34, notahlv 317-20
:"(1982), 125 1) I. R. (3d). 107
;<*None of the present |iistues ot the Siipiem r Court of Canada seems to have Ix-eti a memlx-i ol either 
Parliament or a provincial legislature
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I f  th e  S u p rem e  C o u rt’s decision on th e  conven tions g o vern ing  the 
am en d m en t o f  th e  p re-1982  C onstitu tion  becom es a p reced en t, an d  the 
courts u n d e rta k e  au th o rita tiv e  defin ition  o f  o th e r  conven tions, w hat force 
will th e ir  defin itions have?
Legally, o f  cou rse , none. A S u p rem e  C o u rt o f  C an ad a  decision on a 
m a tte r o f  law is final an d  b ind ing . A S u p rem e  C o u rt o f  C an ad a  decision 
on a m a tte r  o f  conven tion  is m erely  an  expression  o f  o p in io n  by five to 
nine em in en t persons lea rn ed  in th e  law, but not necessarily in the  co n ­
ventions, an d  is en titled  to no  m ore  respect, p e rh ap s  less, th an  the  op in ion  
o f  o th e r  em in en t (or even no t so em inen t) persons with a specialized know l­
edge o f  conventions.
So the  answ er to  th e  q u estion , “ Is it desirab le , o r  even safe, to have 
the co u rts  m aking  such decisions?” m ight ap p e a r to be. “ It doesn 't reall\ 
m atter. Such decisions a re  just obiter iluta.
B ut th a t does no t wholly d ispose o f  the  m atter. G e r tru d e  Stein, in a 
ce leb ra ted  morceau, said: “A rose is a rose is a rose”. For a la rg e r p a rt o f 
the C anad ian  public, a decision o f  the  S u p rem e  C ourt o f  C an ad a , w hether 
on law o r  conven tion , is a decision is a decision is a decision; an d  woe betide 
the G o v ern m en t o r  th e  political party  that d a res  question , o r  d is reg a rd , o r 
ru n  c o u n te r  to  it. The recep tion  accorded  to the  decision o f  S ep tem b er 28. 
1981, on  the  conven tion  g o vern ing  am en d m en t o f  the  p re-1982  C onsti­
tu tion , is p ro o f  o f  tha t. In g en era l, the  m edia, p a rliam en ta rian s , the  public, 
accepted  it as settling  the  q u es tio n ;80 and  th e  G overnm en t o f  C an ad a  knuc­
kled u n d e r  at once. Back it obedien tlv  went to the  b arg a in in g  table, a.id  
ou t cam e a drastically  ch an g ed  p roposal which had th e  consent of nine 
provinces, which alm ost everybody, except Q uebec, felt met th e  C o u rt’s 
req u irem en t o f  “su b stan tia l” consent.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION: CONCLUSION
T h e re  is, I subm it, g rave d a n g e r  that the  C ourt will increasinglv be 
asked to ru le  on  constitu tional conventions; tha t, its ap p e tite  w hetted  bv 
its tr iu m p h  o f  S ep tem b er 28, 1981, it will succum b to the  tem p ta tio n ; th.it 
its decisions, on  conventions, how ever unclear, ill-founded , illogical o r  im ­
practicable, will be accep ted  as, fo r all practical p u rposes, final, b ind ing  
and  infallable; th o u g h  they may set every practising  politician 's ha ir s tan d ­
ing on  en d  “like quills u p o n  the  fre tfu l p o rp e n tin e ”.
l ake, fo r instance, the  alleged “ru le ” th.it a f te r  a g enera l election the 
G overno r-G enera l will (.ill upo n  the  leader of the  parts with the greatest 
n u m b er of seals to form  a ( iovet n inen t. A t( ep tance  of tins w ould tr.m siet 
to th e  G o v ern o r G enera l a m ost im portan t pow er which p ro p e t l\ belongs, 
and  in a p arliam en tary  dem oc rat \ m ust belong, to the H ouse of ( o m in o u s
“ At least two em its, Proirssoi Sotx*rman. m T h e  lo u r t and the LnnUUulitm liT-7 I . anti I’k>I« s m > i  M(Wlimn«-\. 
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But th e  nex t tim e an election  fails to  give any party  m ore  th an  half the  
seats, the  lead er o f  th e  largest party  m ight well call o n  the  C o u rt to  give 
its im p rim a tu r to  tha t p a r t o f  th e  d issen ting  o p in ion  o f  Septem l>er 28, 1981. 
I f  th e  C o u rt obliged , he w ould th en  be in a position to  say tha t it was the 
constitu tional d u ty  of the  G o v ern o r-G en era l to  dism iss th e  G overnm en t in 
office, and  call on  him  to  fo rm  a G o v ern m en t. Refusal w ould be b ran d ed  
“un co n stitu tio n a l”.
O r  su p p o se  a fu tu re  S u p rem e  C o u rt ru les tha t a p a rticu la r de fea t in 
th e  H ouse o f  C om m ons, on  a bill o r a reso lu tion  (like, fo r instance, the  
Pearson G o v e rn m en t’s d e fea t in 1968), is a vote o f  w ant o f  confidence, 
req u irin g  th e  G o v ern m en t e ith e r  to resign (to m ake way fo r a n o th e r  G ov­
e rn m e n t in the  ex isting  H ouse o f  C om m ons) o r  to ask fo r a dissolution  o f  
P arliam ent (a fresh  election). T h is  w ould be a m isread ing  o f  the  tru e  con ­
vention ; bu t how could  th a t s tand  against a “decision” o f  the  h ighest co u rt 
in the  land? It is fo r the  H ouse of C om m ons, no t any co u rt, to  decide what 
is o r  is not a  sn ap  vote, o r  w h e th e r a p a rticu la r de fea t constitu tes censu re  
o r  w ant o f  confidence; a n d  th e  H ouse, as 1968 p roved , is perfectly  able to 
d o  it. It shou ld  not have a change  o f  G overnm en t o r  a g enera l election 
im posed on  it by the  judiciary. A nd  the  case w ould be no  b e tte r if the C ourt 
u n d e rto o k  to d ec ide  w h e th e r th e  p a rticu la r d efea t had  been  “substan tia l”, 
o r  w h eth er th e re  had  been  a “suffic ien t” n u m b e r o f  m em bers p resen t.
N or can we exclude  th e  possibility tha t a f u tu re  B ench m ight excogitate 
ou t o f  its own in n e r  consciousness a conven tion  tha t no  bill dealing  with 
language o r  cu ltu re , passed by P arliam ent, was constitu tionally  valid unless 
it had  received a m ajority  o f  the  votes at bo th  the E nglish-speaking  and  
the  F rench-speak ing  m em bers, of o n e  H ouse o r bo th . C o n ju red  by the 
S uprem e C o u rt, the  ghost of p o o r o ld S andfield  M acdonald 's pet notion 
of “d o ub le  m ajority” (w hich was never accep ted  even in th e  old province 
o f  C anada) w ould walk, w ould indeed  ru le  th e  roost; especially since to use 
the  w ord “c u ltu re ”, now adays, is to "o p en  th e  gates as wide as the  skv and  
‘let a whole tro o p  o f  k ings’ com e rid in g  by”."1 T h e  “princ ip le  of d ua lity” 
w ould be m ade p a rt o f  o u r  C o n stitu tion , no t by constitu tional am en d m en t 
but by judicial fiat. T h is  is not dem ocracy.
T h e n , th e re  is th e  S en a te ’s abso lu te veto over legislation. T h is  has not 
been exercised  fo r  over forty  years. W hat is th e re  to p rev en t som eone from  
asking the  S u p rem e  C o u rt to ru le  tha t, by conven tion , the  veto has l>ecome 
unconstitu tional?
It may be ob jected  th a t these  hypothetical cases a re  m ere  figm ents of 
an  o v erh ea ted  im agination . But th e  six ju dges them selves said: "A federal 
constitu tion  prov ides fo r the  d istrib u tio n  of pow ers betw een  various Leg­
islatures an d  G o v ern m en ts  and  may also constitu te  a fertile  g ro u n d  fo r the  
grow th o f  constitu tional conven tions betw een these L egisla tures and  G ov­
1,1 F o r  e x a m p l e s  o f  |iist h o w  v w d e  might I k - t h e  s c o p e  o f  “ d u a l i t y " ,  see Minutr\ of ihr Prix rrtlingy and t  vuirnrr 
of I hr Sprcuil joint (.ommittrr of ihr Snw tr and thr Hoiisr of (Commons on Srnalr Rrform. N o .  I. p  3 1 . a n d  N o
7 . p p  (»0 . 7 2 . 7 *i
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e rn m en ts . It is conceivable fo r instance tha t usage an d  practice  m ight give 
b irth  to  conven tions in C an ad a  re la ting  to  the  ho ld ing  of federal-provincial 
conferences, th e  ap p o in tm e n t o f  L ieu tenan t-G overno rs, and  th e  reserva­
tion and  disallow ance o f  provincial legislation .8-
A nd w ho w ould decide  w hen th e  b irth  had  taken  place? W ho would 
decide  the  n a tu re  o f  the  o ffsp ring?  W ho would give it legitim acy, and  the  
pow er, fo r practical p u rposes, to m odify  o r  o v errid e  the  law? WThy, the 
S u p rem e  C o u rt, o f  course! W ho else? The p a tria tion  case settled  that long 
ago!
Even if the  ju d g e s  sta te  a conven tion  correctly , th e re  is the  d a n g e r that 
they may freeze  it, em balm  it, petrify  it; p rev en t “th e  political actors" from  
m odifying it to  m eet a new situation , o r  je ttiso n in g  it com pletely because 
it is no  longer re levan t o r  practicable. O r  they may p resen t th e  revival o f  
an  o ld convention  su p e rsed ed  by political developm ents, which new c ir­
cum stances have m ade relevan t again  (as with the  pre-1968 convention  
abo u t a G o v ern m en t a fte r  an  election , w aiting fo r the  verdict of the  new 
H ouse o f  C om m ons).
If, as the  six judges them selves said, “C onven tions develop  in a political 
h e ld ”;H, if, as they said o f  th e ir  “c o n te n tio n " , “it will be fo r the  political 
actors to d e te rm in e ” the  precise co n te n t;84 if, as the  d issen ting  opin ion  said, 
“the  sanction  fo r non-observance o f  a conven tion  is political in that d is­
reg a rd  o f  a conven tion  m ay lead to a political d efea t, to loss of office, o r 
to o th e r  political consequences”8’, th en  it follows tha t any a ttem pt b\ the  
cou rts  to d e h n e  conven tions is a judicial invasion of the  in d ep en d en ce  of
«(1982), 125 I) L.R. (Sd). 84 
"Ibid  . 103
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"'Clause 53 of Bill (.-60 ot 1978 contained this exttaordmarv provision "In the n r n i  (hat th«- Cabinet is 
unable to command the confidence ol the House ot Commons . the Prime Mimstei shall loithwith so 
inform the («overnor General and as soon as possible thereafter tender to the (.overnot (.< nci.il his 
ot her advice on (a) whether Parliament should l>e dissolved, ot (hi it the dissolution is not advised t>\ 
the Prime Minister or is refused bv the (»overnot General, whelhet the Prime Mimstei should be inxilrd in 
Iorm anothrr administration, or whether the resignation ot the Prime Mimstei and »/ thr othn mrmbri\ of ¡hr 
C.abmrt should bt atcfptrd to |ieruut some person other than himself ot herself to l>e «ailed u | k >i i  h\ the 
Governor General to form the administration tor the time l K - m g  ot Canada" (italics mine) 1 his provision 
was presumably dratted bv a lawyer. It provides a good illustration ol the tad that lawveis mas Ik- vc-iv 
imperfectlv acquainted with constitutional usage In the fust place, the dialtsm an was evidently unawaic 
of the fact that the resignation ol a Prune Minister carries with it. automatically. that ot the »hole ( abmet 
In the second place, it suggests that a Prune Minister wtio has |ust lost the contidence ol the House ol 
Commons might nevertheless advise that his resignation should not Ik- accepted fthough dissolution ol 
Parliament has not t>een advised, or has lx-en refused). I hud. it suggests that a Prune Mimstei whose 
Cabinet has |ust lost the confidence ot the House ot Commons might advise the Governoi (•<nci.il t<> 
appoint him head of a new Government At the time. I puhliilv |Mnnted out that this meant that a Ptime 
Minister who had |ust been censured bv the House could "prance into Kideau Hall and sa\ Well, N<>ui 
Excellency, I have |ust lieen censured bv the House ot (.om inous I now invite vou to call on me to !;>i in 
a new Government' ” I tie replv "Ob' I he House ot Commons would defeat him I said " \cs. and lie 
could then march into Kideau Hall and sav. Well. Yout Excellency. I have now Ix-cn twice icn su ied  bv 
the House of Commons Mv c laim to Ik- asked to lot hi a new (»over nment is now, ttv /ie to ie . twite as si long  
as it was the day U-tore vestetdav ". AnvbtKlv who could draft that clause simply has no idea ol what 
responsible government means.
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th e  political pow er an d  a u su rp a tio n  of its righ ts. N o r shou ld  th e  courts, 
w h eth er on  a p lea  of “bold s ta tescraft” o r  o therw ise, pull politicians’ chest­
nu ts o u t of th e  fire.
N or is this all. A cceptance o f  S u p rem e  C o u rt decisions on  constitu tional 
conventions is likely to  s tren g th en  the  h an d s o f  those w ho com plain  o f  the 
“silences” in th e  Constitution Act, 1867 (which th e  Constitution Act, 1982, has. 
fo rtuna te ly , hard ly  touched ); who w ant to  w rite  th e  conventions in to  the 
form al, w ritten  law C onstitu tion ; w ho w ant to have the  w ritten  law C o n ­
stitu tion  d efine  responsib le  g o v ern m en t (which w ould involve e ith e r  a s ta te­
m en t so sum m ary  as to be com pletely  at th e  m ercy of jud ic ia l in te rp re ta tio n ; 
o r im possibly e labo ra te , in a hopeless ef fo rt to p rov ide  fo r every conceivable 
situation— w hich, again , m ight leave crucial political decisions in the  han d s 
o f  the  judges). It is, say the  p ro p o n e n ts  o f  th e ir  no stru m , such a nu isance 
no t to have th e  ru les laid dow n in black an d  white, in section U m p ty -T h ree  
o f  the  C on stitu tio n  Act, 198? to 199?; beyond question  o r  cavil, except, o f 
course, the  legal a rg u m en t about what th e  w ords o f  th e  section m ean in a 
p a rticu la r case; on which th e  S u p rem e  C o u rt o f  C anada  th en  re n d e rs  a 
final and  b in d in g  decision, to  the  g enera l satisfaction. T h a t it may be to 
the  general d issatisfaction, and  tha t rem ed y in g  the situation  w ould then  
req u ire  a constitu tional am en d m en t, w hich w ould have to have the  assent 
o f  at least th e  Legislatures o f  seven provinces with half the  popu la tion  of 
the  ten , does no t seem  to have o ccu rred  to them .
T h e  “silences” o f  o u r  w ritten  C onstitu tion  a re . in fact, o ne  of its greatest 
glories. T h ey  leave us room  to  ad ap t, to  innovate , to ex p erim en t, to grow ; 
room  for B o rd e n ’s “exercise o f  the com m onp lace  quality  o f  com m on sense”.
T h e  Q uebec  Liberal p a rty ’s Beige Paper o f  1980 provides one  illustra­
tion o f  just how fa r this yearn ing  to  get every th ing  set dow n in black and  
w hite in th e  w ritten  C onstitu tion  (and th e re fo re  changeable  only by the 
e laborate , p robably  long d raw n  ou t, p rocess o f  constitu tional am en d m en t) 
can go. T h a t d o cu m en t even saw “m erit” in the  idea that the  S tand ing  
O rd e rs  of th e  H ouse of C om m ons shou ld  be w ritten  in to  a new Constitution 
Act.
T his  m ight Ik * considered  the ne plus ultra o f  the  invasion of the  righ ts 
an d  pow ers of the  H ouse of C om m ons, an d  th e  m ost g laring  a ttem p t to 
destroy  a m ost im p o rtan t p a rt of the  flexibility of o u r  political system . But 
p e rh ap s  even w orse, because vaguer an d  m ore  sw eeping, and  actually e m ­
bodied  in a G o v ern m en t bill to am en d  the C onstitu tion , was clause 35 of 
Bill C-60 of 1978. T h a t clause read : “T h e  C onstitu tion  o f  C anada  shall be 
th e  su p rem e law of the  C anad ian  fed e ra tio n , and  all o f the  institu tions of 
the C anad ian  fed era tio n  shall l>e go v ern ed  by it” (so far, so good) "and  by 
the conventions, customs and usages hallowed by it ". T h is  w ould have placed the  
conventions at the  m ercy o f the  S u p rem e  C ourt o f  C anada. T h e  conventions 
w ould, in fact, have been abolished; rep laced  by judicial decisions on what 
would have becom e m atters  o f  strict law. T h e  u su rp a tio n  ol political pow er 
bv the judiciary w ould have been, pn> tanto, com plete  and  unchallengeable .
/
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except, o f  course, by the  long  d raw n  o u t— an d  probably  fiercely fo u g h t— 
process o f  constitu tional a m e n d m e n t. It w ould have con stitu ted  a bloodless 
bu t sw eeping an d  d rastic  revo lu tion  in o u r  system o f  g o vernm en t.
So my answ ers to  th e  th re e  questions I raised ea rlie r  in this artic le  are: 
T h e  C o u rts  have no t, n o r shou ld  they  have, the righ t to  decide  what the 
conven tions o f  th e  C o n stitu tion  are . I f  they  a ttem p t to  d o  so, th e  decision 
has 110 fo rce at all, legal o r  o th e r. It is not desirab le , o r  even safe, to  have 
the co u rts  m aking  such decisions. O n  th e  co n tra ry , it is m ost d an g ero u s . 
A cceptance o f  th e  S u p rem e  C o u rt's  decision on  conven tions in th e  patria- 
tion case w ould m ean  a Q u ie t R evolution  in o u r  system  o f  g o v ern m en t. It 
would b lu r the  d istinction  betw een conven tion  an d  law. It could  lead to 
supersession o f  th e  law set ou t in th e  w ritten  C o nstitu tion  by judicially 
d e te rm in ed  “co n v en tio n ”. It could  p rov ide  a m eans o f  c ircum ven ting  the 
explicit provisions fo r constitu tional am en d m en t set ou t in the  Constitution 
Act, 1982. It could  subvert p a rliam en ta ry  g o v ern m en t. Eacilis descensus /\r-
